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ABSTRACT 
 
 
House Prices and Mortgage Defaults: Econometric Models 
and Risk Management Applications 
 
By 
 
XIANGJING WEI 
 
07/2010 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. _SHAUN WANG___ 
 
Major Department: __Risk Management and Insurance______ 
 
 
This dissertation first investigates the possible house price trend and the relationship with 
the mortgage market, from the perspective of risk management; then it chooses the angle from 
bond insurers and figures out possible methods to avoid capital procyclicality. 
As for the first chapter, based on the Granger-Causality test, we apply vector auto 
regression models (VAR) and simultaneous equations models (SEM) to estimate the dynamic 
relations among house price returns, mortgage rates and mortgage default rates, using 
historical data during the time period of 1979 through second quarter 2008. We find that 
house prices would be better estimated and predicted with the consideration of the mortgage 
market. 
In Chapter II, following the methodology of co-integration, we first construct four 
succinct measures to display the possible intrinsic values of house prices. The fifth measure is 
defined as a weighted average of the first four. In the short run, house price return dynamics 
are investigated by dynamic adjustments following Capozza et al (2002) and error correction 
models. The estimations reflect gradual adjustments towards the long-run intrinsic values. The 
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impacts of the mortgage credit market on house price returns are also analyzed. Furthermore, 
we examine the possible overshooting problem of house price returns. By both analytical 
derivations and simulations, we demonstrate the effects of the coefficients on overshooting. 
In Chapter III, we adopt a structural model with time-varying correlations, which are 
closely tied up with the business cycle, for bond insurers. When deriving the total loss 
distribution and economic capital for a bond insurer, we consider losses due to bond insurers’ 
downgrading and losses from both insurance contracts and investment portfolio. On that 
basis, we propose forward-looking smoothing rules of capital over a full business cycle, 
instead of only based on a short-term horizon, to avoid the procyclicality. With the smoothed 
capital, a bond insurer can actually establish some capital buffer in good times to support the 
potential losses in crisis. 
 
 7
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER 0: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 10 
CHAPTER I: DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS AMONG HOUSE PRICE RETURNS, MORTGAGE 
RATES AND DEFAULT RATES: STUDY OF THE RECENT MORTGAGE CRISIS .................... 13 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................ 13 
I.1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 14 
I. 2. DATA................................................................................................................................................. 16 
I.3. GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST ............................................................................................................... 21 
I.4. VAR PROCESS .................................................................................................................................... 23 
I.5. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODEL (SEM) AND EXTENDED SEM..................................................... 23 
I.5.1. Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM)........................................................................................ 23 
I.5.2 SEM: Model Specification .......................................................................................................... 24 
I.5.3 SEM: Estimation Results ............................................................................................................ 26 
I.5.4. Extended SEMs.......................................................................................................................... 33 
I.5.5. Extended SEMs: Estimation Results .......................................................................................... 35 
I.6. MODEL PREDICTIONS ......................................................................................................................... 37 
I.6.1. Prediction Performance Comparison........................................................................................ 37 
I.6.2. Testing of Predictive Performance using data through the end of 2007 ................................... 41 
I.6.3. Model Predictions Using Data through 2008Q2....................................................................... 50 
I.7. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 54 
CHAPTER I REFERENCES........................................................................................................................... 55 
CHAPTER II INTRINSIC VALUES AND DYNAMICS OF HOUSE PRICES.................................. 57 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................ 57 
II.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 58 
II.2. INTRINSIC VALUES OF HOUSE PRICE................................................................................................. 62 
II.2.1. Co-integration .......................................................................................................................... 62 
II.2.2. Measure 1................................................................................................................................. 63 
II.2.3. Measure 2................................................................................................................................. 63 
II.2.4. Measure 3................................................................................................................................. 64 
II.2.5. Measure 4................................................................................................................................. 64 
II.2.6. Measure 5................................................................................................................................. 65 
II.2.7. Empirical Results ..................................................................................................................... 66 
II.3. SHORT TERM ADJUSTMENT AND HOUSING DYNAMICS..................................................................... 71 
II.3.1. Dynamic Adjustment................................................................................................................. 71 
II.3.2. Error Correction Models.......................................................................................................... 73 
II.4. OVERSHOOTING ................................................................................................................................ 79 
II.4.1. Case 1....................................................................................................................................... 79 
II.4.2. Case 2....................................................................................................................................... 83 
II.5. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................... 84 
CHAPTER II REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 90 
CHAPTER III BOND INSURERS: AVOIDING CAPITAL PRO-CYCLICALITY .......................... 94 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................ 94 
III.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 95 
III.2. BOND INSURANCE INDUSTRY: OVERVIEW ....................................................................................... 97 
III.3. THE MODEL................................................................................................................................... 104 
III.3.1 Stochastic Process ................................................................................................................. 104 
III.3.2 Loss Distribution.................................................................................................................... 106 
III.3.3 Total Losses for a Bond Insurer............................................................................................. 108 
III.3.4 Economic Capital................................................................................................................... 109 
III.3.5 Capital Smoothing ................................................................................................................. 111 
 8 
III.3.6 Establishing Capital Buffer.................................................................................................... 114 
III.4. MODELING THE BUSINESS CYCLE.................................................................................................. 115 
III.5 SIMULATION RESULTS .................................................................................................................... 121 
III.5.1 Parameter Values................................................................................................................... 121 
III.5.2 Simulation Steps..................................................................................................................... 123 
III.5.3 Calculating Unsmoothed and Smoothed Economic Capital .................................................. 124 
III.5.4 Capital Buffer......................................................................................................................... 126 
III.6. CONTINGENT CAPITAL BUFFER ..................................................................................................... 127 
III.7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 127 
CHAPTER III REFERENCES: ..................................................................................................................... 129 
 9
  
Chapter 0: Introduction 
 
U.S. house prices peaked in 2006 and began their steep decline thereafter. Mortgage 
defaults and foreclosure soared. As a result, mortgage-backed securities lost most of their 
value. Since the securities are widely held by financial firms, there has been a large 
decline in the capital of many financial institutions, including bond insurers. 
There are two main purposes of this dissertation. The first is to investigate the 
possible house price trend and the relationship with the mortgage market, from the 
perspective of risk management. We are not trying to analyze the underlying economic 
mechanisms of the crisis. Instead, we study the problem from the viewpoint of a 
professional in risk management. Many companies, especially financial institutions, hold 
products related with mortgages. They need to have a rough idea about the state of the 
housing market, whether mortgage defaults have impacts on the housing market, and 
what the corresponding risk management methods are. By our analysis, we can at least 
answer the following questions: With the consideration of mortgage defaults, will the 
house prices be better estimated and predicted? How can we estimate the intrinsic values 
of house prices? Will the house prices adjust back immediately if they are overvalued or 
undervalued? 
 The second purpose is linked to risk management applications. More specifically, we 
consider a bond insurer and analyze the impacts of the business cycle (especially 
financial crisis) on its financial situations. Bond insurers are very sensitive to the changes 
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in the business cycle. In particular, the bonds have the tendency to have higher 
correlations with each other in deep recession (or crisis), so systemic economic shocks 
may have serious impacts on bond insurers. In order to keep their ratings, bond insurers 
need more capital in credit crisis, which may worsen their financial conditions further. 
Therefore, their capital requirements may be even more pro-cyclical. Based on our 
model, we propose possible methods to avoid capital procyclicality. 
Chapters I and II are related with the first purpose. More precisely, in Chapter I, we 
analyze the interactions among house price returns, default rates and mortgage interest 
rates. We utilize a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) and a Simultaneous Equation 
model (SEM). Based on the observations and our analysis, house prices impact mortgage 
defaults, and vice versa. This could explain why the severity of the crisis is heavier than 
what we originally expected. By working on a structural model, the dynamic relations 
among house price returns, mortgage rates and default rates can be investigated better. 
However, the relatively high standard errors may render the estimates fluctuating in a 
wide range. 
In Chapter II, we examine the long term housing intrinsic value, short term dynamics, 
and overshooting problems. The basic method we employ to detect the housing intrinsic 
value is co-integration. We define five measures of housing intrinsic values considering 
different economic aspects as the possible criteria in order to determine whether house 
prices are overvalued or undervalued. After determining the intrinsic values of house 
prices, we continue to investigate the short term dynamics based on dynamic adjustments 
following Capozza et al. (2002) and error correction models. Specifically, the serial 
correlation term (momentum effect) and the deviation term from the intrinsic value are 
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examined. As for the possible overshooting problem of house price returns, we 
analytically derive the consecutive house price returns after an unexpected shock at time 
0 assuming the intrinsic house price returns equal to zero. Then, by simulation, we 
demonstrate the possible effects of the coefficients of the serial correlation term, 
deviation term and immediate adjustment term. 
Chapter III serves the second purpose. More specifically, we adopt a structural model 
with time-varying correlations, which are closely tied up with the business cycle, for 
bond insurers. We analyze the impacts of bond insurers’ downgrades on bond values and 
incorporate them into the total losses of bond insurers. The losses on both insurance 
contracts and investment portfolios are also considered. On that basis, we propose 
forward-looking smoothing rules of capital over a full business cycle, instead of only 
based on a short-term horizon, to avoid the procyclicality. The simulation results show 
the effects of changing parameter values in smoothing rules. The smoothed capital may 
vary from lower degree of procyclicality to totally counter-cyclicality, corresponding to 
the different parameter values. With the smoothed capital, a bond insurer can actually 
establish some capital buffer in good times to support the potential losses in times of 
crisis. 
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Chapter I: Dynamic Relationships among House Price 
Returns, Mortgage Rates and Default Rates: Study of the 
Recent Mortgage Crisis 
 
Abstract 
Based on the Granger-Causality test, we apply vector auto regression models (VAR) and 
simultaneous equations models (SEM) to estimate the dynamic relations among house price 
returns, mortgage rates and mortgage default rates, using historical data during the time period of 
1979 through second quarter 2008. We estimate that, holding all other factors constant, two 
consecutive 1% increases of default rates can drive house price returns down by about 7%-18%. 
Conversely, two consecutive 1% decreases of house price returns can increase the current default 
rate by 0.04%-0.09%.  
We apply our econometric models in making predictions using data up to the second quarter 
of 2008. The FHFA’s and Case-Shiller’s indices exhibit different patterns and thus they yield 
different predictions. The predicted future level of the FHFA’s house price returns will remain 
negative and reach the lowest value in 2010; it may take some years for the house price returns to 
become positive. However, we get more optimistic forecasts using the Case-Shiller’s index, 
whereas the future house price returns would become positive since 2010, and mortgage default 
rates will peak by 2010 and decrease thereafter. We add caveats for interpreting these mechanical 
forecasts: they do not reflect many important dynamics that will strongly impact the housing 
markets, for instance, the various government mortgage modification programs, and the inventory 
of excess housing units. 
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I.1. Introduction 
The mortgage crisis began with sharp falls of house prices after the United States 
housing boom peaked in 2005-2006 and became apparent in 2007, signaled by a sharp 
rise in mortgage defaults and foreclosures in the United States. It has affected almost all 
investments which derive their values from mortgage loans, such as Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (MBSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Up to the middle of 
2008, several hundred billion dollars in losses have been reported and written off by the 
financial institutions that were heavily invested in those products. Much of the capital of 
the banking system was wiped out. Mortgage insurers and bond insurers were also hit 
hard. Further, the mortgage crisis spread to the general economy. 
Many papers discuss the causes and effects of the mortgage crisis. Their analyses 
focus on many aspects: falling house prices, high-risk mortgage loans and eased lending 
standards, securitization, roles of credit rating companies, government policies and so on. 
For example, Crouhy et al. (2008) examine the players and issues at the heart of this 
crisis. Cagan (2007) and Weaver and Reeves (2007) emphasize the impacts of mortgage 
rate reset. Mayer et al. (2009) find that the rise in defaults through mid-2008 was not 
linked to the novel mortgage products. Foote et al. (2008) state that interest-rate resets 
may not be the main problem in the mortgage market. Both of the two papers claim that 
higher foreclosure rates stem from falling house prices. Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
(2010) analyze loan-level data and find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six 
consecutive years before the crisis. Problems could have been detected long before the 
crisis, but they were masked by high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005. 
Greenlaw et al. (2008) and Hatzius (2008) put emphasis on modeling mortgage credit 
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losses, based on the effects of home price declines on foreclosure and mortgage credit 
losses. 
Taylor (2008) investigates the role of government actions and interventions in the 
financial crisis and claims:  
(1) The main cause of the housing boom and the resulting bust is monetary 
excesses, in terms of the low federal funds interest rates from 2000 to 2004. 
(2) Falling house prices cause higher mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. 
(3) The above effects are amplified by the excessive risk taking behaviors, such 
as the use of subprime mortgages, the adjustable rate mortgage variety, the 
easy mortgage underwriting procedures, securitization, etc.  
We analyze the interactions among house price returns, default rates and mortgage 
interest rates. Our purpose is to at least answer the question: With the consideration of 
mortgage defaults, will the house prices be better estimated and predicted? 
We utilize a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) and a Simultaneous Equation 
model (SEM). Based on the observations and our analysis, house prices impact mortgage 
defaults, and vice versa. This could explain why the severity of the crisis is heavier than 
what we originally expected. Relying on a structural model, the dynamic relations among 
house price returns, mortgage rates and default rates can be investigated explicitly. 
Holding all other factors constant, two consecutive 1% increases of default rates can 
drive the FHFA’s1 house price returns down by about 7.64% and the Case-Shiller’s 
current house price return down by about 18%. Conversely, two consecutive 1% 
decreases of the FHFA’s or Case-Shiller’s house price returns can drag the current 
                                                 
1 The Federal Housing Finance Agency. It is previously called “the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO)” 
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default rate up by 0.09 percent or 0.04 percent, respectively. However, relatively high 
standard errors may render the above estimates fluctuating in a wide range.  
We apply our models in making predictions using data up to the second quarter of 
2008. The FHFA’s and Case-Shiller’s indices exhibit different patterns and thus they 
yield different predictions as well.  Per the data up to the second quarter of 2008, the 
expected future level of the FHFA’s house price returns will remain negative and reach 
the lowest value in 2010; it may take some years for the house price returns to become 
positive. However, we get more optimistic forecasts using the Case-Shiller’s index: the 
future house price returns tend positive beyond 2010; and mortgage default rates peak by 
2010 and decrease thereafter. 
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows: Section I.2 explains the 
historical dynamics and data. Section I.3 applies the Granger-Causality test. Sections I.4 
presents the VAR process. Section I.5 presents the Simultaneous Equation Model and 
extended SEM model. Section I.6 makes predictions based on the models. Section I.7 
summarizes our conclusions. 
 
I. 2. Data 
For house prices, we investigate both the FHFA’s House Price Index and the S&P/ 
Case-Shiller’s House Price Index.2 Both of the indices are repeat sales indices. The S&P/ 
                                                 
2 Additionally, the current house price series (or indices) used to measure national trends include the 
median price of existing homes sold (published by the National Association of Realtors) and the median 
price of new homes sold (published by the Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce). 
These two indices are not seasonally adjusted and reflect only recent sales, so they are volatile in the short 
run. 
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Case-Shiller index is value-weighted, based on 10 or 20 metropolitan areas3, available 
from 1987. The FHFA’s index is unit-weighted, based on the fifty states and Washington 
D.C., available from 1975. Moreover the FHFA’s House Price Index only uses the data 
based on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages. The Case-Shiller’s House Price Index 
obtains data from county assessor and recorder offices, and therefore covers more houses 
in the specific areas. 
Figure I.1 displays the differences between the two indices. The Case-Shiller’s Index 
shows larger fluctuations than the FHFA’s Index. Between the end of year 2006 and the 
second quarter of 2008, the FHFA’s house price index had a cumulative decrease of 
−1.16 percent, while the Case-Shiller’s house price returns accumulated to a loss of about 
−20 percent. 
As for the mortgage rate, we use the 30-year fixed mortgage rates from the Federal 
Reserve’s website. 
Although it is generally agreed that this mortgage crisis originated in subprime 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), the mortgage default rates for all the listed types of 
mortgage products have been increasing since late 2006. Figure I.2 shows the percentages 
of different loans4 past due 90 days between 1998 and the second quarter of 2008, 
obtained from the Mortgage Bankers Association. Table I.1 displays different mortgage 
delinquency rates and foreclosure rates in the year end 2005-2007 and the second quarter 
                                                 
3 The 10 metropolitan areas include Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, 
San Diego, San Francisco, and Washington DC. The 20 metropolitan areas also include Atlanta, Charlotte, 
Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Portland (Oregon), Seattle, and Tampa 
4 They include Prime FRM (fixed rate mortgages), Prime ARM (adjustable rate mortgages), Subprime 
FRM, Subprime ARM and all loans. 
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of 2008, which rose at different rates since 2007, even for Prime mortgages. We use the 
percentage of all loans past due 90 days as a proxy for the mortgage default rate5. 
Figure I.3 shows the historical data in the FHFA’s house price return, mortgage 
interest rates and default rates over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.1: quarter-over-quarter the FHFA’s vs. Case-Shiller’s house price returns to 
2008Q2 
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5 Practically, the differences between mortgage delinquency and mortgage default are based on the number 
of days of missed installments. Delinquency refers to the non-payment of a mortgage payment due, so it 
may be defined as a 30-days-and-over delinquency, a 60-days-and-over delinquency or a 90-days-and-over 
delinquency. Default happens when a borrower fails to pay back 90-days’ installment due and the fourth 
payment is due.  
 18 
Figure I.2: default rates for all types of mortgage loans 
Default Rates for Different Types of Mortgages: 1998Q1-2008Q2
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Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
Figure I.3: house price returns, mortgage rates and default rates 
This figure displays the historical quarterly data of house price returns, mortgage rates and default 
rates from first quarter 1979 to second quarter 2008. The left-side y-axis is for house price return and 
default rate. The right-side y-axis is for mortgage rate. The default rates are multiplied by 2 in this 
graph to keep them in the same range as the house price returns. 
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 Table I.1: Mortgage Delinquency Rates 
 
The default rates of all types of mortgages have increased in different degrees, especially the  
adjustable rate mortgages (ARM). 
 
    2005Q4 Increased* 2006Q4 Increased* 2007Q4 Increased* 2008Q2 Increased**
Loans Past Due 30 Days 2.85% 2.89% 3.08% 8.07% 3.20% 3.90% 3.30% 3.13%
Loans Past Due 60 Days 0.83% 10.67% 0.90% 8.43% 1.15% 27.78% 1.28% 11.30%
Loans Past Due 90 Days 1.02% 18.60% 0.96% -5.88% 1.48% 54.17% 1.83% 23.65%
All loans 
Loans in Foreclosure 0.42% -8.70% 0.54% 28.57% 0.83% 53.70% 1.19% 43.37%
                   
Loans Past Due 30 Days 1.49% 0.00% 1.64% 10.07% 1.72% 4.88% 1.90% 10.47%
Loans Past Due 60 Days 0.35% 12.90% 0.34% -2.86% 0.44% 29.41% 0.57% 29.55%
Loans Past Due 90 Days 0.37% 48.00% 0.29% -21.62% 0.40% 37.93% 0.60% 50.00%
Prime 
FRM 
Loans 
Loans in Foreclosure 0.15% -11.76% 0.16% 6.67% 0.22% 37.50% 0.37% 68.18%
                   
Loans Past Due 30 Days 1.76% 13.55% 2.30% 30.68% 2.89% 25.65% 3.24% 12.11%
Loans Past Due 60 Days 0.44% 33.33% 0.63% 43.18% 1.20% 90.48% 1.56% 30.00%
Loans Past Due 90 Days 0.34% 47.83% 0.47% 38.24% 1.41% 200.00% 2.70% 91.49%
Prime 
ARM 
Loans 
Loans in Foreclosure 0.20% 5.26% 0.41% 105.00% 1.06% 158.54% 1.93% 82.08%
                   
Loans Past Due 30 Days 5.06% 1.00% 5.57% 10.08% 7.17% 28.73% 8.05% 12.27%
Loans Past Due 60 Days 1.60% 1.27% 1.73% 8.12% 2.54% 46.82% 3.14% 23.62%
Loans Past Due 90 Days 3.04% -2.88% 2.78% -8.55% 4.29% 54.32% 4.84% 12.82%
Subprime 
FRM 
Loans 
Loans in Foreclosure 1.05% -23.36% 1.09% 3.81% 1.52% 39.45% 2.28% 50.00%
                   
Loans Past Due 30 Days 6.74% 13.66% 7.93% 17.66% 8.80% 10.97% 8.68% -1.36%
Loans Past Due 60 Days 2.35% 23.68% 3.13% 33.19% 4.58% 46.33% 4.80% 4.80%
Loans Past Due 90 Days 2.53% 25.87% 3.38% 33.60% 6.64% 96.45% 7.55% 13.70%
Subprime 
ARM 
Loans 
Loans in Foreclosure 1.55% 3.33% 2.70% 74.19% 5.29% 95.93% 7.09% 34.03%
 
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association 
*: Increased percentage compared with one year ago 
**: Increased percentage compared with the end of 2007 
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 I.3. Granger Causality test 
We first apply the Granger Causality test6, which examines whether one time series can 
help forecast another variable, to support the dynamic analysis among house price returns, 
mortgage rates and default rates. 
Suppose we have two terms X and Y, which are time series variables. In the presence of 
lagged Y, if an F-test on lagged observations of X shows that the X observations provide 
statistically significant information about future values of Y, then X is said to Granger-cause 
Y. Therefore, Y is better predicted per the histories of X and Y than only per the history of Y. 
The VAR model is a simple approach to implementing the Granger Causality test. 
Table I.2 exhibits the results of the test by using the data through the second quarter of 
2008. We obtain similar results for both the FHFA’s and Case-Shiller’s house price returns. 
At the 10% significance level, house price returns Granger-cause default rates, and vice versa. 
House price returns Granger-cause mortgage interest rates, but conversely not. There is no 
apparent Granger causality between mortgage interest rates and default rates.  The reason may 
be that our test is based on the aggregate level data. However, the results are sufficient for us 
to investigate the dynamic relationships among the three variables, especially between house 
price returns and default rates. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The detailed explanation can be found in Granger (1969).  
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Table I.2: Granger Causality Test for house price returns, default rates and mortgage rates 
 
The table shows whether group 2 variable Granger-causes group 1 variable. The null hypothesis 
of the test is that group 2 variable does not Granger-cause group 1 variable. 
 
We obtain similar results for both the FHFA’s and Case-Shiller’s house price returns. At the 10% 
significance level, house price returns Granger-cause default rates, and vice versa. House price 
returns Granger-cause mortgage interest rates, but conversely not. There is no Granger causality 
between mortgage interest rates and default rates. 
 
Granger Causality Test 
Test Group 1 Variable Group 2 Variable Chi-Square Prob>Chisq 
1 FHFA House Price Return First-differenced Default Rate 11.38 0.0226 
2 FHFA House Price Return First-differenced Mortgage Rate 5.19 0.2683 
3 First-differenced Default Rate FHFA House Price Return 8.41 0.0775 
4 First-differenced Default Rate First-differenced Mortgage Rate 0.79 0.9395 
5 First-differenced Mortgage Rate FHFA House Price Return 10.39 0.0343 
6 First-differenced Mortgage Rate First-differenced Default Rate 0.59 0.9636 
          
Test Group 1 Variable Group 2 Variable Chi-Square Prob>Chisq 
1 Case-Shiller's House Price Return First-differenced Default Rate 41.06 <.0001 
2 Case-Shiller's House Price Return First-differenced Mortgage Rate 8.38 0.3005 
3 First-differenced Default Rate Case-Shiller's House Price Return 18.37 0.0104 
4 First-differenced Default Rate First-differenced Mortgage Rate 5.97 0.5438 
5 First-differenced Mortgage Rate Case-Shiller's House Price Return 12.31 0.0907 
6 First-differenced Mortgage Rate First-differenced Default Rate 2.7 0.9112 
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 I.4. VAR process 
We first utilize a vector autoregressive process VAR(p): 
t
p
i
itit YY ε+Φ= ∑
=
−
1
, 
where  refers to the endogenous variables and  refers to 
a vector white noise process.  is a 
( ′= tttt MRDHRY ,, ) )( ′= tttt 321 ,, εεεε
iΦ 33×  matrix.  is quarter-over-quarter house price 
return at time t;  denotes the mortgage rate at time t;  refers to the default rate at time 
t. The mortgage rates and default rates are first-differenced since they are integrated of order 
one. 
tHR
tMR tD
According to the Akaike information criterion (AIC)7, we choose VAR(7) for the FHFA’s 
house price return and VAR(12) for the Case-Shiller’s house price return, with the first-
differenced mortgage interest rates and default rates. The lagged periods are chosen based on 
the significance level of the coefficients. 
 
I.5. Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) and Extended SEM 
I.5.1. Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) 
Case and Shiller (1990) build a forecasting model for house price return, including both 
lagged house price returns and other exogenous variables.  
In our paper, since we have more than one endogenous variable, a simultaneous equations 
model is introduced and some exogenous variables are included. Our model can be 
represented as 
                                                 
7 Akaike (1974) 
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where X, Y and Z refer to vectors of economic variables. The first part of each equation can 
be regarded as a fundamental value or an intrinsic value of the endogenous variable. The 
serial correlation part represents the momentum. This model is under a structural framework, 
so that the relationships among the variables could be more clearly examined.  
 
I.5.2 SEM: Model Specification 
The Simultaneous Equation Model can be specified as follows: 
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In the house model (I.2a), we use the inflation rate ( )Inf 8, disposable personal income 
( )Inc 9, unemployment rate (Unem )10, construction cost (CC)11, and the 3-month Treasury bill 
rate (TB3m)12 as the exogenous variables. We choose the 3-month Treasury bill rate as the 
indicator of market interest rate.  
The mortgage rate equation (I.2b) includes inflation rate (Inf), gross domestic product 
(GDP)13, 10-year treasury bond rate (TB), the 3-month Treasury bill rate (TB3m).  
The default rate equation (I.2c) may contain the inflation rate (Inf), thecomposite loan-to-
value ratio (CLTV)14, disposable personal income ( ), and the 3-month Treasury bill rate 
(TB3m).  
Inc
We checked the stationarity of all the variables, using the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test. Only house price return and inflation rate reject the non-stationary null at 1% 
significance level. All other variables are integrated of order 1. In order to avoid spurious 
regression, we correspondingly add the lagged or differenced terms. 
To detect multicollinearity, we examined tolerance15 , variance inflation factor16  and 
condition indexes 17 . The variables currently in equation I.2a-I.2c show no serious 
multicollinearity. 
                                                 
8The data of inflation rate come from the Consumption Price Index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) 
9 The data on disposable personal income are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ website 
10 The unemployment rate is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Household Survey 
11 We use Construction Price Index as the measure of construction cost. This index is the price deflator index of 
new one-family houses under construction from U.S. Census Bureau. 
123-month Treasury bill rate and 10-year Treasury bond rate are available on the Federal Reserve Board’s 
website 
13 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
14 from the U.S. Federal Housing Finance Board 
15 The tolerance measures the correlation between one independent variable and all the other independent 
variables. If we define as the correlation between one dependent variable X and all the other independent 
variables 
2
~, XXR
X~ , then the tolerance (TOL) would be . A small value of tolerance means that the 
variable X is highly correlated with the other variables. 
2
~,1 XXX RTOL −=
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For the models dealing with the FHFA’s house price returns, we use quarterly data from 
first quarter 1979 through second quarter 2008, with 128 observations in total, due to the data 
source restrictions of mortgage default rate. For the models dealing with the Case-Shiller’s 
house price returns, we use quarterly data from first quarter 1987 through second quarter 
2008, with 86 observations in total. 
 
I.5.3 SEM: Estimation Results 
Using the three-stage-least-squares method, we carry out two regressions for both the 
FHFA’s and Case-Shiller’s house price returns. For house price returns, mortgage rates and 
default rates, one regression contains only one-period-lagged observations, while the other 
one includes multi-period-lagged or multi-period-changed observations. The results are listed 
in Table I.3. Since for the exogenous variables, the coefficients either have the same signs as 
we expected or are insignificant, our analysis mainly focuses on the three key variables. 
 
Serial Correlation Term 
All the three endogenous variables have highly significantly positive serial correlation 
coefficients. Obviously, they have a strong tendency to keep their original values.  
 
Interrelationship among the three variables  
1) House price return equation (Table I.3(1)) 
                                                                                                                                                        
TOL/1=
1.0<
10>
16 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is the inverse of tolerance, 
XXVIF , showing the degree by 
which the standard error of the estimator is inflated by multicollinearity. Practically, TOL  and 
equivalently VIF  indicate a multicollinearity problem. 
17The Conditional index is the ratio of a specific eigenvalue over the maximum of all eigenvalues of the model 
matrix. As an informal rule, a conditional index over 30 may show multicollinearity. 
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Default rates have consistent effects on house price returns for both regressions and both 
indices. The current default rate has negative coefficients on house price returns, showing that 
the increased default rate will drive the current house price returns down, due to increased 
supply or shrunken credit. Combining this observation with the positive estimates of the 
lagged default rates would reflect a complicated process. Take regression 1 for the FHFA’s 
house price return as an example. The effects of a 1% increase of one-period-lagged default 
rate on the current house price return are a 9.56% 18 increase. Additionally, if the current 
default rate also increases by 1%, then the current house price return will decrease by 7.64% 
(=17.20%-9.56%) finally. Similarly, the two consecutive 1-percent increases in default rates 
will depress the Case-Shiller’s current house price return by 18.37%. 
As for mortgage rates, the dominant estimates are negatively correlated with the current 
house price return, meaning that low mortgage rates will drive the housing demand up and so 
increase the house price returns, and vice versa. The two consecutive 1% increases of 
mortgage rates will depress the FHFA’s or Case-Shiller’s current house price returns by 
0.47% or 0.83% respectively. 
 
2) Mortgage rate equation (Table I.3(2)) 
The impact of the default rate on the mortgage rate is complicated, because mortgage rates 
may be decomposed into two parts. One is market interest rate and the other is margin, which 
reflects the willingness of the banks to provide credit. Due to the margin effect, although the 
market interest rates fell since September 2007, the mortgage rates did not change in the same 
                                                 
18 In regression 1 for the FHFA’s house price return, a 1% increase of one-period-lagged default rate will lead to 
a 10.77% decrease in one-period-lagged house price returns and correspondingly a 5.82%(=10.77%*0.54) 
decrease in current house price returns. At the same time, the 1% increase of one-period-lagged default rate will 
result in a 11.42% increase in current house price returns. Therefore, the net effects of a 1% increase of one-
period-lagged default rate on the current house price return would be a 5.60% (=11.42%-5.82%) increase in 
current house price return. 
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direction or similar magnitude. The increase in default rates commonly leads to declining 
market interest rates due to the policymakers’ intervention and increased margin due to the 
unwillingness for the mortgage providers to provide credit. The coefficients on default rates 
with the two house price indices are different, reflecting the complicated effects. 
As for house price returns, the current house price returns are dominant and have negative 
effects. It means that higher house price return will urge the mortgage providers to provide 
more credit, and so ease the credit market and lower the mortgage rate. For example, the two 
consecutive 1% increases of the FHFA’s or Case-Shiller’s current house price returns will 
depress mortgage rates by 0.61% or 0.07% respectively. 
 
3) Default rate equation (Table I.3(3)) 
The negative coefficient on the current house price return shows that the dropped house 
price return lowers the housing equity and makes it more difficult to pay back the mortgage 
by refinancing, which drives the default rate up.  
Again take Regression 1 as example. Two consecutive 1% decreases of the FHFA’s house 
price returns will push the current default rate up by 0.09 percent. And two consecutive 1% 
decreases of the Case-Shiller’s house price returns will push the current default rate up by 
0.04 percent. 
In terms of mortgage rates, for the new mortgagors, the augmented fixed mortgage rates 
make it more difficult for buyers with lower affordability to get a mortgage loan, which 
causes lower default rate. At the same time, the current mortgagors have comparatively lower 
contract rates and tend to keep their contracts and not to default. The results may not be 
consistent with the intuition that the risen mortgage rates drive up default rates. The reasons 
 28 
may be that (1) we are analyzing at the aggregate level; (2) by using 30-year fixed mortgage 
rate, we exclude the adjustment of the mortgage rates in the current contracts.  
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 Table I.3 (1): regression results for SEM –house price return equation 
This table exhibits the regression results of the Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) for the house price return 
equation. The part (1) is from the model with the FHFA’s house price returns. The part (2) is from the model 
with the Case-Shiller’s house price returns. The data are centered at the mean.  
Equation: House Price Return 
 
With the FHFA's House 
Price Return (1) 
With the Case-Shiller’s 
House Price Return(2) 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2 
Intercept 
 
0.026 
(0.200) 
0.076 
(0.310)
-0.642 
(0.658) 
-0.503 
(0.336)
1-period-lagged house price return 
 
0.504** 
(0.104) 
0.402** 
(0.228) 
0.707** 
(0.272) 
1.088** 
(0.175) 
2-period-lagged house price return 
 
  
  
0.112 
(0.257) 
  
  
-0.523** 
(0.272) 
3-period-lagged house price return 
 
  
  
0.114 
(0.328) 
  
  
0.360* 
(0.252) 
4-period-lagged house price return 
 --  --  
  
  
-0.288* 
(0.216) 
30-year fixed mortgage rate 
 
-0.772** 
(0.240) 
-0.856** 
(0.418) 
-0.527 
(1.249) 
-0.338 
(0.497) 
1-period-lagged 30-year fixed mortgage 
rate 
0.688** 
(0.226) 
0.767** 
(0.400) 
0.066 
(0.837) 
0.001 
(0.404) 
1-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate 
  
  
-0.094 
(0.343) 
  
  
-0.509* 
(0.382) 
2-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate 
  
  
0.271 
(0.369) 
  
  
-0.213 
(0.309) 
3-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate 
  
  
0.016 
(0.262) 
  
  
0.278 
(0.334) 
default rate 
 
-17.201** 
(7.037) 
-18.255 
(18.530) 
-25.596 
(33.181) 
-23.263** 
(12.027) 
1-period-lagged default rate 
 
18.232** 
(7.705) 
18.383 
(19.578) 
25.173 
(34.236) 
23.627** 
(13.190) 
1-period-lagged change of default rate 
 
  
  
4.543 
(4.630) 
  
  
1.413 
(2.872) 
2-period-lagged change of default rate 
 
  
  
0.539 
(2.718) 
  
  
-2.296 
(2.969) 
3-period-lagged change of default rate 
 
  
  
4.413 
(6.371) 
  
  
4.070* 
(2.881) 
inflation rate 
 
-0.044 
(0.103) 
0.014 
(0.109) 
-0.008 
(0.343) 
-0.343 
(0.269) 
lagged inflation rate 
 
0.593* 
(0.225) 
0.462 
(0.514) 
0.944 
(1.767) 
0.807 
(0.647) 
change in income 
 
6.648 
(9.777) 
-1.842 
(11.418) 
25.028 
(38.340) 
6.725 
(15.026) 
change of 3-month Treasury bill rate 
 
0.069 
(0.121) 
0.096 
(0.230) 
-0.462 
(0.569) 
0.469 
(0.424) 
change in construction cost 
 
0.044 
(8.021) 
2.617 
(9.579) 
6.727 
(34.194) 
2.129 
(16.539) 
unemployment rate 
 
-0.003 
(0.047) 
0.030 
(0.104) 
0.069 
(0.374) 
-0.273 
(0.323) 
change in unemployment rate 
 
0.069 
(0.384) 
-0.186 
(0.657) 
-0.389 
(1.815) 
1.401 
(1.096) 
Note: *20%, **10% indicate the corresponding significance levels. The numbers in parentheses refer to the 
standard errors of the coefficients. 
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Table I.3(2): regression results for Model 2—Mortgage Rate Equation 
 
This table exhibits the regression results of the Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) for the mortgage rate 
equation.    Part (1) is from the model with the FHFA’s house price returns. Part (2) is from the model with 
the Case-Shiller’s house price returns. The data are centered at the mean.  
 
Equation: Mortgage Rate 
With the FHFA’s house 
price return (1) 
With the Case-Shiller’s 
house price return (2) 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2 
-0.002 0.008 -0.157** -0.103 Intercept 
 (0.102) (0.108) (0.065) (0.068) 
0.963** 0.957** 0.992** 0.998** 1-period-lagged 30-year fixed 
mortgage rate (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) 
 0.075  0.018 1-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate  (0.100)  (0.054) 
 0.084  -0.007 2-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate  (0.100)  (0.053) 
 -0.045  0.031 3-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate  (0.073)  (0.050) 
-3.807* -7.617** 1.360* 1.123 
default rate (2.586) (3.934) (1.071) (0.896) 
3.832* 7.595** -1.566* -1.319* 
1-period-lagged default rate (2.793) (4.057) (1.081) (0.910) 
 2.180**  0.592* 1-period-lagged change of default 
rate  (1.197)  (0.418) 
 -0.218  0.240 2-period-lagged change of default 
rate  (0.855)  (0.406) 
 1.299  0.111 3-period-lagged change of default 
rate  (1.455)  (0.433) 
-0.477** -0.616** -0.064 -0.028 
house price return (0.149) (0.179) (0.073) (0.058) 
0.325** 0.367** 0.059 0.051 
1-period-lagged house price return (0.084) (0.086) (0.063) (0.069) 
 0.003  -0.025 
2-period-lagged house price return  (0.081)  (0.046) 
 0.088  0.024 
3-period-lagged house price return  (0.084)  (0.043) 
-- --  -0.026 
4-period-lagged house price return    (0.027) 
0.241** 0.245** -0.011 0.023 
lagged inflation rate (0.087) (0.115) (0.062) (0.060) 
0.917 0.955 8.867** 6.784* 
Change of nominal GDP (5.440) (5.718) (4.091) (4.327) 
0.567** 0.443** 0.820** 0.825** Change of 10-year Treasury bond 
rate (0.096) (0.111) (0.052) (0.053) 
-0.027 0.009 0.063* 0.071 
change of 3-month Treasury bill rate (0.055) (0.066) (0.047) (0.059) 
Note: *20%, **10% indicate the corresponding significance levels. The numbers in parentheses refer to the 
standard errors of the coefficients. 
 
 
 
 31
Table I.3 (3): regression results for Model 2—Default Rate Equation 
 
This table exhibits the regression results of the Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) for the default rate 
equation. Part (1) is from the model with the FHFA’s house price returns. Part (2) is from the model with the 
Case-Shiller’s house price returns. The data are centered at the mean.  
Equation: Default Rate 
 
With the FHFA’s house 
price return (1) 
With the Case-Shiller’s 
house price return(2) 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2 
0.002 0.006 -0.023* -0.015 
Intercept (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) 
1.059** 1.019** 0.994** 1.056** 
1-period-lagged default rate (0.034) (0.038) (0.054) (0.099) 
 0.238**  0.074 1-period-lagged change of default 
rate  (0.117)  (0.165) 
 0.023  -0.070 2-period-lagged change of default 
rate  (0.114)  (0.145) 
 0.257**  0.202* 3-period-lagged change of default 
rate  (0.126)  (0.143) 
-0.046** -0.040** -0.022 -0.019 
30-year fixed mortgage rate (0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) 
0.041** 0.036** 0.005 0.007 1-period-lagged 30-year fixed 
mortgage rate (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) 
 -0.007  -0.014 1-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate  (0.012)  (0.019) 
 0.014*  0.006 2-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate  (0.011)  (0.021) 
 -0.001  0.004 3-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate  (0.010)  (0.020) 
-0.058** -0.043** -0.033* -0.006 
house price return (0.019) (0.016) (0.025) (0.032) 
0.029** 0.017* 0.022 0.005 
1-period-lagged house price return (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.034) 
 0.006  -0.005 
2-period-lagged house price return  (0.010)  (0.019) 
 0.002  0.004 
3-period-lagged house price return  (0.011)  (0.018) 
 --  0.000 
4-period-lagged house price return    (0.012) 
0.034** 0.026** 0.039 0.053** 
lagged inflation rate (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) 
-0.002 0.045 0.038 0.552 
composite loan-to-value ratio (0.215) (0.173) (0.219) (0.465) 
0.001 0.047 0.009 0.109 Change of composite loan-to-value 
ratio (0.226) (0.159) (0.223) (0.536) 
0.372 -0.074 0.933 0.873 
change in income (0.565) (0.481) (0.793) (0.807) 
0.004 0.006 -0.015 -0.027 
change of 3-month Treasury bill rate (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.032) 
Note: *20%, **10% indicate the corresponding significance levels. The numbers in parentheses refer to the 
standard errors of the coefficients. 
 
 32 
 I.5.4. Extended SEMs 
We extend the SEMs in Section I.5.1 by adding cumulative fundamental-actual 
differences term, in order to identify the impacts of deviations from fundamental-driven 
values. 
Assume that in each time period t the house price return, the mortgage rate and the default 
rate have their fundamental values determined by economic conditions. 
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where ,  and  represent the fundamental values determined by equation (I.3). So 
we have 
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where ,  and  are the error terms. Following Abraham and Hendershott (1996), the 
error terms could be described as an adjustment dynamics: 
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where ,  and  are the cumulative fundamental-
actual differences. ,  and  are the error terms. Putting these equations together, we get 
a simulataneous equations model: 
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   (I.4) 
For such a simultaneous equations model, the typical estimation method is three-stage-
least-square (3SLS). And another difficulty is that ,  and  themselves depend on 
the estimation results from the model. We follow the estimation method of Abraham and 
Hendershott (1996). The steps are as follows: 
*
tHR
*
tMR
*
tD
(1) estimating equation (I.4) without the cumulative fundamental-actual difference 
terms; 
(2) calculating ,  and  (i=1,2,…,t-1), so that we can obtain the 
cumulative fundamental-actual difference terms ,  
and .   
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equation (I.4).   
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(4) Recalculating , ,  (i=1,2,…,t-1) and , 
, . 
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(5) Re-estimating equation (I.4) till the coefficients converge.   
This method is based on the idea that if the fundamental-driven terms, the lag term and the 
cumulative fundamental-actual difference term are uncorrelated, the coefficient estimation 
would be stable. 
 
I.5.5. Extended SEMs: Estimation Results 
Table I.4 exhibits part of the three-stage-least-square regression results for the extended 
SEM with the FHFA’s index19.  
The fundamental-actual difference term presents the cumulative effects of the 
fundamental-driven factors on the actual data. Since all the serial correlation coefficients in 
our model are positive, a positive coefficient on the fundamental-actual difference term 
displays the deviation from the lagged actual value, while a negative coefficient strengthens 
the lagged actual value. 
Basically, the actual house price returns converge around 3-4 percent each quarter of the 
difference. Under most cases, the difference term in house price equation is statistically 
significant. 
The actual default rate deviates 0.4-1 percent and, in three-equation models, the actual 
mortgage rate converges around 0.5 percent, although highly statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
19 We do not report the estimation results of the extended SEM with Case-Shiller’s index. Those results can be 
obtained by request. 
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Table I.4: Part of 3SLS Regression Results for Model 3 with the FHFA’s house price returns 
Three-Equation SEM with 1-period lag terms 
House Price Return Equation  
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
1-period-lagged house price return 
0.563** 
(0.084) 
0.564** 
(0.103) 
0.611** 
(0.085) 
Lagged Deviation Term of House Price 
0.038** 
(0.019) 
0.037** 
(0.021) 
0.048** 
(0.017) 
Default Rate Equation  
1-period-lagged default rate 
 1.043** 
(0.035) 
1.059** 
(0.036) 
1.079** 
(0.037) 
Lagged Deviation Term of Default 
Rate  -- 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
Mortgage Rate Equation  
1-period-lagged 30-year fixed 
mortgage rate 
 0.949** 
(0.017) 
 0.962** 
(0.016) 
0.959** 
(0.020) 
Lagged Deviation Term of Mortgage 
Rate  --  -- 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
Three-Equation SEM with multi-period lag/change terms 
House Price Return Equation  
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
1-period-lagged house price return 0.493** 
(0.113) 
0.468** 
(0.114) 
0.512** 
(0.105) 
2-period-lagged house price return 0.031 
(0.131) 
0.036 
(0.131) 
0.006 
(0.121) 
3-period-lagged house price return 0.270** 
(0.140) 
0.327** 
(0.123) 
0.284** 
(0.109) 
Lagged Deviation Term of House Price 
0.014 
(0.018) 
0.041** 
(0.016) 
0.031** 
(0.012) 
Default Rate Equation  
1-period-lagged default rate 1.013** 
(.038) 
1.055** 
(0.060) 
1.056** 
(0.065) 
1-period-lagged change of default rate 0.231** 
(0.107) 
0.156 
(0.189) 
0.090 
(0.196) 
2-period-lagged change of default rate -0.018 
(0.108) 
-0.075 
(0.160) 
-0.106 
(0.178) 
3-period-lagged change of default rate 0.267** 
(0.122) 
0.202 
(0.248) 
0.035 
(0.240) 
Lagged Deviation Term of Default 
Rate  -- 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
Mortgage Rate Equation  
1-period-lagged 30-year fixed 
mortgage rate 
0.934* 
(0.019) 
0.956** 
(0.016) 
0.958** 
(0.017) 
1-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate 
0.009 
(0.103) 
0.097 
(0.082) 
0.062 
(0.098) 
2-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate 
0.061 
(0.104) 
-0.007 
(0.083) 
-0.031 
(0.092) 
3-period-lagged change of 30-year 
fixed mortgage rate 
-0.019 
(0.085) 
-0.040 
(0.067) 
-0.065 
(0.078) 
Lagged Deviation Term of Mortgage 
Rate  --  -- 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
Note: **10% indicate the corresponding significance levels. The numbers in parentheses refers to the standard errors of 
the coefficients 
Regression 1 only includes the difference term in house price return equation. Regression 2 contains the difference 
terms in house price return equation and the default rate equation. Regression 3 has the difference terms in all the three 
equations. 
 36 
 I.6. Model Predictions 
In this part, we first try to make some prediction performance comparisons among 
different models. Second, we use the data up to the fourth quarter of 2007, in order to 
compare the predicted values with the actual data for the first two quarters of 2008. Third, we 
use the data up to the second quarter of 2008 to make more predictions. 
 
I.6.1. Prediction Performance Comparison 
Generally, different models are specified for different purposes and are used to predict 
over various horizons. We do not want to jump to a conclusion as to which model is better. 
We conduct the comparisons, based on the quarterly predictions of the AR model, the VAR 
model, the one-period lagged SEM and the multi-period lagged SEM, for the two periods: (1) 
from first quarter 2005 through second quarter 2008; (2) from the first quarter of 2007, the 
beginning period of the mortgage crisis, through second quarter 2008.  
For the period from first quarter 2005 through second quarter 2008, we compare eight-
quarter-ahead predictions by a rolling window analysis. For example, we first employ the data 
through fourth quarter 2004 to estimate, and make predictions for first quarter 2005 through 
fourth quarter 2006, based on the estimates. Then we estimate via the data through first 
quarter 2005 and predict for second quarter 2005 through first quarter 2007. Since the data 
used in this paper are only through second quarter 2008, when observations are not available 
for the latest or future periods, the prediction results are dropped from the comparison sample. 
The predictions for SEM’s are conditional predictions, so we use the actual observations for 
exogenous variables. 
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 For the period from first quarter 2007 through second quarter 2008, we compare four-
quarter-ahead predictions by a rolling window analysis. 
The measure of prediction accuracy is the root mean squared error (RMSE). Then for s-
quarter-ahead prediction performance, the formula is 
( ) 2/1
1
ˆ1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= ∑
=
T
t
tst YYT
RMSE , 
where  is the actual observation at time t for house price return, mortgage interest rate or 
default rate,  is the prediction made s quarters earlier, and T is the total numbers of the 
predictions made s quarters earlier during the above specified period. 
tY
tsYˆ
Table I.5 exhibits the prediction comparison results using the FHFA’s or Case-Shiller’s 
house price returns, measured by RMSE, for the period from first quarter 2005 through 
second quarter 2008. Table I.6 exhibits the prediction comparison results for the period from 
first quarter 2007 through second quarter 2008. 
We have to admit that the samples we explored during the test periods are small, 
especially in the second period, which may somewhat affect the results. However, a few 
results are still clear. In forecasting house price returns and default rates, the VAR model and 
SEM models produce better predictions results than the AR model. These results are also 
consistent with the Granger-causality test. One important factor which affects the results may 
be that our comparison periods are near or in the subprime crisis, when the increased 
mortgage default rates may have heavier impacts on house prices. 
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Table I.5: Prediction Performance Comparison, Root Mean Squared Error, 2005Q1—
2008Q2 
 
The left side of this table exhibits the results using the FHFA’s house price returns; the right side 
of the table displays the results using the Case-Shiller’s house price returns.  
  the FHFA's House Price Return  the Case-Shiller’s House Price Return 
Prediction 
Horizon AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM  AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM 
1 0.899 0.757 0.758 0.776  1.304 1.065 1.168 1.221 
2 1.177 1.065 0.98 0.859  2.039 1.685 2.196 2.327 
3 1.268 1.194 1.004 0.858  2.411 2.091 2.597 2.499 
4 1.302 1.393 1.044 1.212  3.074 2.837 3.578 3.438 
5 1.506 1.692 0.966 1.34  3.574 3.400 4.201 4.011 
6 1.648 1.896 0.976 1.481  4.811 4.145 5.133 4.529 
7 1.771 2.104 1.012 1.78  5.356 4.924 6.142 5.323 
8 1.875 2.266 1.092 1.967  5.862 5.839 7.506 6.324 
  Mortgage Interest Rate  Mortgage Interest Rate 
Prediction 
Horizon AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM  AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM 
1 0.251 0.313 0.127 0.273  0.251 0.408 0.129 0.133 
2 0.438 0.521 0.144 0.32  0.438 0.845 0.197 0.194 
3 0.533 0.507 0.262 0.346  0.533 1.032 0.315 0.267 
4 0.635 0.53 0.461 0.451  0.635 1.312 0.419 0.360 
5 0.735 0.593 0.666 0.578  0.735 1.570 0.452 0.423 
6 0.885 0.589 0.752 0.646  0.885 1.722 0.535 0.499 
7 0.961 0.391 0.827 0.616  0.961 1.875 0.638 0.532 
8 1.004 0.341 0.898 0.705  1.004 2.040 0.825 0.567 
  Mortgage Default Rate  Mortgage Default Rate 
Prediction 
Horizon AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM  AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM 
1 0.103 0.103 0.106 0.098  0.103 0.111 0.079 0.090 
2 0.194 0.194 0.201 0.184  0.194 0.168 0.137 0.159 
3 0.283 0.285 0.317 0.278  0.283 0.239 0.203 0.237 
4 0.396 0.402 0.426 0.389  0.396 0.345 0.279 0.339 
5 0.469 0.481 0.501 0.461  0.469 0.403 0.353 0.434 
6 0.533 0.55 0.537 0.49  0.533 0.455 0.386 0.488 
7 0.574 0.591 0.574 0.504  0.574 0.462 0.397 0.509 
8 0.605 0.617 0.618 0.521  0.605 0.406 0.368 0.527 
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 Table I. 6: Prediction Performance Comparison, Root Mean Squared Error, 2007Q1—
2008Q2 
 
The left side of this table exhibits the results using the FHFA’s house price returns; the right side of 
the table displays the results using the Case-Shiller’s house price returns.  
  the FHFA's House Price Return  the Case-Shiller’s House Price Return  
Prediction 
Horizon AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM  AR VAR
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM
1 1.418 0.852 0.765 0.623  2.950 0.722 0.487 0.741
2 2.589 1.822 1.181 0.506  8.109 0.999 5.710 6.971
3 3.39 2.585 1.563 0.455  7.269 0.762 5.259 5.662
4 4.102 3.752 2.301 1.109  3.732 1.120 15.716 16.767
  Mortgage Interest Rate  Mortgage Interest Rate   
Prediction 
Horizon AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM  AR VAR
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM
1 0.062 0.148 0.027 0.075  0.062 0.192 0.031 0.013
2 0.221 0.549 0.048 0.129  0.221 0.952 0.086 0.050
3 0.201 0.593 0.137 0.192  0.201 0.578 0.217 0.104
4 0.063 0.644 0.536 0.443  0.063 0.224 0.377 0.134
  Mortgage Default Rate   Mortgage Default Rate  
Prediction 
Horizon AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM  AR VAR 
one-period 
lagged SEM 
multi-period 
lagged SEM 
1 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.015  0.017 0.021 0.011 0.014
2 0.073 0.07 0.087 0.068  0.073 0.05 0.046 0.057
3 0.182 0.181 0.267 0.195  0.182 0.121 0.143 0.141
4 0.42 0.424 0.553 0.458  0.42 0.312 0.33 0.361
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 I.6.2. Testing of Predictive Performance using data through the end of 
2007 
Prediction via VAR model 
We first examine relationships between the 3-month Treasury bill rates, the 30-year fixed 
mortgage rate, and mortgage rate spreads (as the differences between 30-year fixed mortgage 
rates and 3-month Treasury bill rates). Although the 3-month Treasury bill rates can come 
down to near zero during some periods of Fed easing, the mortgage rate spreads tend to move 
upward during these economic periods (See Figure I.5).  This opposite movement of mortgage 
spreads will keep 30-year fixed mortgage rates above a certain level. In fact, the historical 30-
year mortgage rates have never come below 5%.  Accordingly, in our econometric modeling 
of future mortgage rates, we put a constraint on future 30-year fixed mortgage rates and they 
will always be no less than 4 percent. 
Figure I.5: Comparison between 3-month Treasury bill rates and mortgage spreads 
Mortgage spreads are the differences between 30-year fixed mortgage rates and the 3-month Treasury bill. 
Although the 3-month Treasury bill rates can come down to near zero during some time periods of Fed easing, 
the mortgage rate spreads tend to move upward during these economic periods, keeping 30-year fixed mortgage 
rates above a certain level . 
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 For both house price indices, we make 3-year forecasts via VAR, using historical data up 
to the fourth quarter of 2007. By comparison, we also make forecasts via Auto-Regressive 
models (AR). We employ Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate confidence intervals for the 
predictions. 
The actual quarter-over-quarter the FHFA’s house price returns for the first two quarters 
in 2008 have continuously deteriorated. The return is -0.23% in the first quarter and -1.45% in 
the second quarter of 2008, which is the worst quarter-over-quarter return since 1975. Figure 
I.6 displays the predicted values of the FHFA’s house price returns for the next three years 
from first quarter 2008 through fourth quarter 2010. The mean values of predicted house price 
returns per the AR model are always positive over time since 2008, which deviates from the 
actual data. On the contrary, the mean values of predicted house price returns per VAR 
models are mainly negative. The predictions based on VAR reach the lowest point in third 
quarter 2009. Additionally, although the confidence intervals per both AR and VAR fail to 
exactly catch the huge deterioration in the second quarter of 2008, the 90% confidence limit 
from VAR is relatively close to the actual data.  
The actual quarter-over-quarter Case-Shiller’s house price returns for the first two quarters 
in 2008 show a different trend. The return is -6.79% in the first quarter, which is lowest since 
1987, and -4.29% in second quarter 2008, which is better than the previous one. Figure I.7 
displays the predicted values of the Case-Shiller’s house price returns for the next three years 
from first quarter 2008 through fourth quarter 2010. The 90% confidence limits catch the 
huge deterioration in first quarter 2008. The mean values of predicted Case-Shiller’s house 
price returns per the VAR model are recovering a little bit quicker than the ones per the AR 
model.  
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The actual national default rates for the first two quarters in 2008 have deteriorated 
further, with 1.63% in first quarter 2008 and 1.83% in second quarter 2008 the highest since 
1979. Figure I.8 shows the expected predictions of national default rates by the AR model, the 
VAR model with the FHFA’s house price returns, and the VAR model with the Case-Shiller’s 
house price returns. The three models roughly catch the trends during the first two quarters of 
2008. While the default rates per the AR model or the VAR model with the FHFA’s house 
price returns display a continuously increasing trend, the expected predictions per the VAR 
model with the Case-Shiller’s house price returns reach the highest in 2009.  
When investigating the predicted mortgage rate, the results from the three models diverge, 
displaying complicated relationships with the other variables. 
These above results clearly show the impacts of mortgage default on the housing market, 
no matter which house price index we use. 
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Figure I.6: Actual vs Predicted the FHFA’s House Price Returns 
The house price returns are from the FHFA’s index. The models use the data through the end of 
2007 and there are 3-year predictions through fourth quarter 2010. 
Figure I.6a: Predictions based on AR model.  
 
Figure I.6b: Predictions based on VAR model.  
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Figure I.7: Actual vs Predicted Case-Shiller’s House Price Returns 
The house price returns are from the Case-Shiller’s index. The models use the data through the 
end of 2007 and there are 3-year predictions through fourth quarter 2010. 
Figure I.7a: Predictions based on AR model.  
 
Figure I.7b: Predictions based on VAR model.  
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Figure I.8: Actual vs Predicted National Default Rates 
The models use the data through the end of 2007 and there are 3-year predictions through fourth 
quarter 2010.  
 
Figure I.8a: Predictions based on AR model 
 
Figure I.8b: Predictions based on VAR model with the FHFA’s House Price Returns 
 
Figure I.8c: Predictions based on VAR model with the Case-Shiller’s House Price Returns 
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Figure I.9: Actual vs. Predicted National Mortgage Rates 
The models use the data through the end of 2007 and there are 3-year predictions through fourth 
quarter 2010.  
 
Figure I.9a: Predictions based on AR model 
 
Figure I.9b: Predictions based on VAR model with the FHFA’s House Price Returns 
 
Figure I.9c: Predictions based on VAR model with the Case-Shiller’s House Price Returns 
 
 
 47
Prediction per SEM 
Based on the known values of the exogenous variables in the first two quarters of 2008, 
we calculate conditional predictions20 per SEM. The expected results per the model with the 
FHFA’s house price returns and the Case-Shiller’s house price returns are shown in Table I.7 
and I.8 respectively. 
The multi-period-lagged SEM obtains the predicted the FHFA house price returns with 
the means of -0.24% and -0.83% (-0.89% if predicted dynamically) and with the confidence 
intervals of [-1.31%, 0.81] and [-1.91%, 0.29%] ([-2.07% 0.33%] if predicted dynamically) in 
the first two quarters of 2008. Similarly, for default rates and mortgage rates, the predicted 
means from the multi-period-lagged SEM are quite close to the actual values. 
For the model with the Case-Shiller’s house price returns, the main exception is the 
predicted result for the Case-Shiller’s house price return in the second quarter of 2008, which 
deviates substantially from the actual value. 
 
                                                 
20 The unconditional predictions do not show much improvement, compared with the results from VAR. We do 
not present the results here. 
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Table 7: Conditional Predictions of the FHFA’s House Price Returns, Mortgage Rates and Default Rates 
the FHFA’s House Price Returns (%) 
  actual VAR  1-period lag SEM multi-period lag SEM 
      
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
3/31/2008 -0.23 0.25 [-0.65 1.19] 0.24 [-0.79 1.34]     -0.24 [-1.31 0.81]     
6/30/2008 -1.45 -0.04 [-1.02 0.96] 0.04 [-1.01 1.10] 0.27 [-0.87 1.43] -0.83 [-1.91 0.29] -0.89 [-2.07 0.33] 
Default Rate (%) 
  actual VAR  1-period lag SEM multi-period lag SEM 
      
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
3/31/2008 1.63 1.56 [1.48 1.63] 1.59 [1.51 1.67]     1.66 [1.57 1.74]     
6/30/2008 1.83 1.64 [1.52 1.76] 1.73 [1.65 1.81] 1.68 [1.56 1.81] 1.79 [1.71 1.87] 1.82 [1.69 1.94] 
Mortgage Rate (%) 
  actual VAR   1-period lag SEM multi-period lag SEM 
      
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
3/31/2008 5.88 5.76 [5.01 6.53] 6.00 [5.45 6.57]     5.96 [5.33 6.57]     
6/30/2008 6.09 5.33 [4.00 6.68] 6.11 [5.52 6.67] 6.28 [5.49 7.10] 6.12 [5.49 6.77] 6.19 [5.10 7.35] 
 
Table 8: Conditional Predictions of the Case-Shiller’s House Price Returns, Mortgage Rates and Default Rates 
the Case-Shiller’s House Price Returns (%) 
  actual VAR 1-period lag SEM multi-period lag SEM 
      
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
3/31/2008 -6.79 -6.14 [-7.74 -4.55] -6.21 [-8.74 -3.65]     -6.46 [-8.30 -4.63]     
6/30/2008 -4.30 -5.36 [-7.65 -3.08] -7.28 [-9.73 -4.69] -6.97 [-9.97 -3.81] -7.00 [-8.94 -5.06] -6.62 [-9.11 -4.18] 
Default Rate (%) 
  actual VAR  1-period lag SEM multi-period lag SEM 
      
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
3/31/2008 1.63 1.61 [1.52 1.69] 1.68 [1.60 1.77]     1.62 [1.52 1.73]     
6/30/2008 1.83 1.86 [1.74 1.98] 1.82 [1.74 1.91] 1.87 [1.76 1.98] 1.82 [1.71 1.93] 1.81 [1.66 1.95] 
Mortgage Rate (%) 
  actual VAR  1-period lag SEM multi-period lag SEM 
      
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
one step 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
dynamic 
forecast 
90% Conf 
Interval 
3/31/2008 5.88 5.81 [5.30 6.31] 5.74 [5.50 5.99]     5.95 [5.65 6.25]     
6/30/2008 6.09 4.98 [4.27 5.71] 6.16 [5.92 6.41] 6.00 [5.67 6.35] 6.42 [6.12 6.73] 6.48 [5.99 6.92] 
 I.6.3. Model Predictions Using Data through 2008Q2 
We re-estimate the VAR model using the data through second quarter 2008 and make 
predictions. And the prediction results are graphed in Figure I.10 with the FHFA’s house 
price returns and in Figure I.11 with the Case-Shiller’s house price returns. 
The prediction results show great differences due to the different trends for the two 
indices. As we mentioned, the FHFA’s house price returns reach the lowest value in second 
quarter 2008, while the Case-Shiller’s house price returns have the lowest value in first 
quarter 2008 and are somewhat higher in second quarter 2008. Additionally, from the end of 
2006 through second quarter 2008, the FHFA’s house price index only decreased by about 1 
percent, while the Case-Shiller’s index dropped down by around 20 percent. The gaps 
between the two indices may come from the differences in their data sources and calculation 
methods, which is beyond our paper’s scope. 
On an expected value basis, the future level of the FHFA’s house price returns will remain 
negative and reach the lowest value in 2010 and increase slowly thereafter, although it may 
take quite a few years for the house price returns to become positive. Based on the 90% 
confidence limits, if predicting optimistically, the house price returns may become positive 
again after 2010. 
The expected Case-Shiller’s house price returns tend to become positive after 2010. 
Figure 11 shows that default rates reach the highest value in 2010 and decrease slowly 
thereafter. 
If we combine these two sets of results, we could say that, considering only the internal 
relationships among house price returns, mortgage rates and default rates, ignoring the effects 
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of external factors, the year 2010 is an important turning point for house price returns and 
default rates. 
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 Figure I.10: Predictions via VAR with the FHFA’s House Price Returns 
The models use the data through second quarter 2008 and there are 3-year predictions through second 
quarter 2011.  
 
Figure I.10a: Predictions of the FHFA’s house price returns 
 
Figure I.10b: Predictions of Default Rate 
 
Figure I.10c: Predictions of Mortgage Rate 
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Figure I.11: Predictions via VAR with the Case-Shiller’s House Price Returns 
The model use data through second quarter 2008 and there are 3-year predictions through second 
quarter 2011.  
 
Figure I.11a: Predictions of the Case-Shiller’s house price returns 
 
Figure I.11b: Predictions of Default Rate 
 
Figure I.11c: Predictions of Mortgage Rate 
 
 53
I.7. Conclusion 
Based on the Granger-Causality test, we present VAR and SEM models to describe the 
dynamic relations of house price returns, mortgage rates and default rates. With their 
structural form, simultaneous equation models can explain the relationships more clearly. By 
investigating both the FHFA’s and Case-Shiller’s house price returns, we find the interactive 
negative relationship between house price returns and default rates. For example, holding all 
other factors constant, two consecutive 1% increases in default rates can drive the FHFA’s 
house price returns down by about 7.64% and the Case-Shiller’s current house price return 
down by about 18%. Conversely, two consecutive 1% decreases of the FHFA’s or Case-
Shiller’s house price returns can push the current default rate up by 0.09 percent or 0.04 
percent, respectively. The effects of mortgage rates show different results for models with the 
two different house price indices, reflecting complicated relationships. 
In SEM models, the three level variables exhibit high serial correlations, reflecting strong 
momentum effects. In the extended SEM model, the house prices display a long-term 
adjustment process toward the fundamental values. 
When making predictions using data through second quarter 2008, we observe that 
mortgage default rates have large impacts on house price returns, and vice versa. So the 
unfolding mortgage default experience can affect the recovery of the housing market. 
According to the VAR model, only considering the inter-relationships among house price 
returns, mortgage rates and default rates, the year 2010 will probably be an important turning 
point for both house price returns and mortgage default rates. We add caveats for interpreting 
these mechanical forecasts: they do not reflect many important dynamical factors that will 
strongly affect the housing markets, for instance, the various government mortgage 
modification programs, and the inventory of excess housing units. 
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 Chapter II Intrinsic Values and Dynamics of House 
Prices 
 
 
Abstract 
Following the methodology of co-integration, we first construct four succinct 
measures to display the possible intrinsic values of house prices. The fifth measure is 
defined as a weighted average of the first four. Estimated via the FHFA’s House Price 
Index, all of the five measures exhibit overvalued house prices by the second quarter of 
2008. On the contrary, using the S&P/Case-Shiller’s Home Price Index, three measures 
show undervalued house prices by the second quarter of 2008. 
In the short run, house price return dynamics are investigated by dynamic adjustments 
following Capozza et al (2002) and error correction models. The estimations reflect 
gradual adjustments towards the long-run intrinsic values. The impacts of the mortgage 
credit market on house price returns are also analyzed. 
Furthermore, we examine the possible overshooting problem of house price returns. 
By both analytical derivations and simulations, we demonstrate the effects of the 
coefficients on overshooting. 
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 II.1. Introduction 
House prices are always an important indicator of an economy and have a strong 
impact on the economy. In particular, the falling house prices since late 2006 are 
regarded as one of the factors which trigger the mortgage crisis. 
On the other side, house prices are determined by a broad array of economic 
variables. Existing academic literature has investigated a lot about the intrinsic values (or 
fundamental values) and bubbles of house prices.   
Some papers use the dominant theory of asset pricing, which focuses on the paradigm 
that stock prices equal to the sum of expected discounted dividends, and define the 
fundamental house prices as the sum of discounted future cash flows. For example, Hott 
and Monnin (2008) define the fundamental house prices as the sum of the discounted 
future imputed rents. Black et al. (2006) assume the fundamental house prices is a 
constant proportion of the expected value of future real disposable income. 
Some papers determine the intrinsic values of house prices by carrying out a 
regression on some basic variables. For example, according to the basic Capozza-Helsley 
urban model, construction cost inflation, real income growth and changes in real after-tax 
interest rates could explain major variation in real house price change. This model is 
utilized to determine the equilibrium house value by Abraham and Hendershott (1996), 
Capozza et al. (2002) and Bourassa et al. (2001). Case and Shiller (2003) find that prices 
move very much in line with income in the majority of states. McCarthy and Peach 
(2002) use co-integration to construct the long-run equilibrium model of real house prices 
as two simultaneous equations: on the demand side, house price is a function of housing 
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stock, income and user cost; on the supply side, house price is expressed as a function of 
investment rate and construction cost. 
Due to the high transaction costs, heterogeneity and illiquidity of housing, the price 
adjustment toward intrinsic value would be a prolonged process. Only a few existing 
papers analyze the dynamic process of the deviation from the fundamental values. 
Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Bourassa et al. (2001) define the deviations from 
the fundamental values as the mean reversion term (or bubble burster) and integrate this 
term in the regression model to describe the dynamics. Capozza et al. (2002) assert that 
the value changes of house price (or house price returns) are governed by three parts: 
serial correlation, reversion to the fundamental value, and immediate partial adjustment 
to fundamentals. Black et al. (2006) regard that the deviation term from the fundamental 
values as a linear function of income. 
As for the house price index, we will investigate both the FHFA21’s House Price 
Index and S&P/ Case-Shiller’s Home Price Index. These two indices are most widely 
accepted nowadays. Both are repeat sales indexes. S&P/ Case-Shiller indices are value-
weighted, based on 10 or 20 metropolitan areas22, available from 1987. The FHFA’s 
indices are unit-weighted, based on the fifty states and Washington D.C., available from 
1975. Moreover, the FHFA’s House Price Index only uses the data based on Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac mortgages. The Case-Shiller’s House Price Index obtains data from 
county assessor and recorder offices and therefore covers more houses in the specific 
areas.  
                                                 
21 The FHFA refers to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which is previously called OFHEO (the Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight). 
22 10 metropolitan areas include Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San 
Diego, San Francisco, and Washington DC. 20 metropolitan areas also include Atlanta, Charlotte, 
Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Portland (Oregon), Seattle, and Tampa 
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The basic method we employ to detect the intrinsic values of house prices is co-
integration. Since most macro variables are non-stationary and integrated of order one, by 
investigating the linear combinations and making the residual series stationary, we could 
find the long term relations. The Engle-Granger two-step method is based on least square 
regression. We utilize this method, instead of asset pricing principles, due to the 
following reason: the basic principle of asset pricing should be suitable for each specific 
house or household. However, it is difficult to find the corresponding rent or income for 
each house. Since in this paper, we use the aggregate house price index as the measure of 
house prices, it is also hard to obtain the exactly matching rent index or income. 
What we will do in this paper is to define five measures of housing intrinsic values 
considering different economic aspects as the possible criteria in order to determine 
whether the house prices are overvalued or undervalued. It is due to the complicated 
relations among the economic variables and, therefore, the difficulty to determine the 
intrinsic values of house prices based on only one measure. The five measures include 
measures based on demand side, based on supply side, based on both demand and supply 
side, based on a rent index, and the combined measure. 
After determining the intrinsic values of house prices, we continue to investigate the 
short term dynamics based on dynamic adjustments following Capozza et al (2002) and 
error correction models. The serial correlation term (momentum effect) and the deviation 
term from the intrinsic value are examined most. Based on national data, the coefficients 
on the serial correlation term and on the deviation term are around 0.6-0.9 and 0.03 
respectively. In the dynamic adjustment part, the coefficient on the immediate adjustment 
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term is 0.1 on average. In the error correlation model part, we examine the short term 
effects of more variables, including mortgage-related variables. 
Inspired by Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Capozza et al. (2002), we look into 
the possible overshooting problem of house price returns. We analytically derive the 
consecutive house price returns after an unexpected shock at time 0 assuming the 
intrinsic house price return equals to zero. Then, by simulation, we demonstrate the 
possible effects of the coefficients of the serial correlation term, deviation term and 
immediate adjustment term. 
We have two major contributions in this paper. First, we advocate multiple measures 
of intrinsic values of house prices, so that we could comprehensively investigate whether 
the house prices are overvalued or undervalued. Following this line, we propose a 
combined measure of intrinsic values, which is a linear combination of the four measures 
obtained on the basis of co-integration. Such a kind of measure could extenuate certain 
extreme situations based on a sole measure. Second, we analytically derive the conditions 
of overshooting assuming the zero intrinsic house price returns. Then, based on 
simulation, we explicitly explain the effects of all the coefficients: the coefficient on the 
serial correlation term delays “overshooting”, but strengthens its magnitude; the 
coefficient on the deviation term speeds up “overshooting” and also enlarge its 
magnitude; the coefficient on the immediate adjustment postpones the occurrence of 
“overshooting” and mitigates its magnitude. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section II.2 describes different measures of 
intrinsic values of house prices. Section II.3 presents the short term dynamics of house 
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price returns. Section II.4 discusses the conditions for house price returns to “overshoot”. 
Section II.5 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
II.2. Intrinsic Values of House Price 
In this section, we will utilize the methodology of co-integration to catch the intrinsic 
values of house prices and, based on the relations with different variables, define them as 
one of the following five measures. 
Since nominal variables are the ones we observe directly, in the following analysis, 
we use nominal variables. In order to reflect the real values, we include the Consumer 
Price Index as the indicator of inflation. 
 
II.2.1. Co-integration 
Intrinsic values could refer to the long-term values of house prices. Since most macro 
variables are non-stationary, co-integration becomes a good way to check the long term 
relations. It is because co-integration could capture the long-run relation tying different 
variables together, although there may exist some short term deviations. 
Engle and Granger (1987) define the concept of degree of integration of a variable. If 
one variable becomes stationary after being differenced d times, then it is said to be 
integrated of order d, or I(d). Most macro variables are integrated of order 1. 
For a vector of time series ( )',,, 21 nyyyY L= , where  (i=1,2,…,n) is integrated of  
order 1, if there exists a vector 
iy
α  so that Yz 'α= is stationary, then this  vector Y is 
said to be co-integrated. The 
1×n
α  is called the co-integrating vector, which reflects the long 
term relationship among the n variables. 
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According to Engle and Granger (1987), one easiest way to estimate α  is an ordinary 
least squares regression, which is called the “co-integrating regression”. Hamilton (1994) 
also states that the OLS estimate of the co-integrating vector is consistent, as long as the 
residual of the regression is stationary. 
 
II.2.2. Measure 1 
In the long run, home construction firms are free to enter and exit the housing market. 
So they would make zero profits. Then, on the supply side, the house price should co-
move with the construction cost. That is 
tttt CPICCH εααα ++∗+= ln*lnln 210* ,                                          (II.1) 
where  represents the intrinsic values of the house price index,  means the 
construction cost, and  denotes the consumer price index representing the inflation. 
*
tH tCC
tCPI
tε  refers to the residual part.  
The coefficient on construction cost is expected to be positive. 
 
II.2.3. Measure 2 
Black et al. (2006) state that the intrinsic values of house prices are related with the 
expected value of future real disposable incomes: 
( ) iti i
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jt
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∞
=
=
+
∑ ∏ ⎟⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
=
1
1
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1
ρ
γ , 
where  is the discount rate. * jt+ρ
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 On the demand side, household income and mortgage rate determine the housing 
affordability: increased household income and decreased mortgage rate enhanced the 
affordability. Therefore we could express the relationship as: 
ttttt CPIMRIncH εβββ +++∗= ln**lnln 321* ,                                        (II.2) 
where  refers to the disposable personal income and  refers to the 30-year fixed 
mortgage rate. So the coefficient on income should be positive, while that on the 
mortgage rate should be negative. 
tInc tMR
 
II.2.4. Measure 3 
In the long run, the housing intrinsic values are determined simultaneously both from 
the supply and the demand side. This measure could be established as a reduced form. 
tttttt CPICCMRIncH εγγγγγ ++++∗+= ln*ln**lnln 43210* .                    (II.3) 
The signs of the coefficients on construction cost, income and mortgage rate should 
be the same as the ones in Measure 1 or Measure 2. 
 
II.2.5. Measure 4 
Plenty of literature regard rent as the dividend of house and assume the housing 
intrinsic value equals to the present value of future rents:  
( )t
tt
tt d
HEntH ++=
+
1
Re
*
1* , 
where  denotes the corresponding rent (index) at time t;  refers to the 
expected value of future housing intrinsic values and  is the discount rate. 
tntRe
*
1+tt HE
td
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Following this idea, the housing intrinsic value should have the long run relationship 
with rent. 
tttt CPIntH εδδδ ++∗+= ln*Relnln 210* .                                                        (II.4) 
And since house prices are increased with rents, the coefficient on rent is expected to 
be positive. 
 
II.2.6. Measure 5 
A measure combining all of the above effects may be needed. One way is to perform 
a regression of house price on all of the above variables (income, mortgage rate, 
construction cost, rent and consumer inflation index). The coefficient on income under 
such a kind of regression is significantly negative, which is opposite to what we expected. 
It may be due to multicollinearity. This indicates that it is not a good way to do the 
regression directly. 
Another method is that we may assign a weight for each measure and obtain a 
weighted average. One possible weight is based on the inverse of volatility (standard 
deviation) of the differences between the actual and fitted log house price returns 
( )*lnln 1 iHHStd − , . ( )4,3,2,1=i
So the corresponding weight is 
( )
( )∑= −
−
4
1
*
*
lnln
1
lnln
1
i i
i
HHStd
HHStd
.                                                                                   (II.5) 
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II.2.7. Empirical Results 
We use the Construction Price Indices from the U.S. Census Bureau as construction 
cost. The disposable personal income is obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The 30-year fixed mortgage rates come from the Federal Reserve Board. The rent 
index and Consumer Price Index are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). All of 
the above variables plus two house price indexes are integrated of order one, based on the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests. 
The residuals of the first four measures are stationary, according to the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Table II.1). Therefore equation (II.1)--(II.4) reflect the 
co-integrating relations between the log house price indexes and the corresponding 
variables. These results may give some explanations about why plenty of papers use the 
rent-to-price and income-to-price ratio to measure whether there exists a bubble in the 
housing market. 
For the first four measures and both house price indices, the coefficients on almost all 
of the variables have expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. Most of the coefficients 
are statistically and economically significant, except mortgage rate in Measure 3. 
It is noticed that the log Consumer Price Index (CPI) has negative coefficients in 
every regression. This variable could be regarded as an adjustment from nominal 
variables to real variables. Since most of the coefficients on other independent variables 
are greater than one, it is reasonable to have negative coefficient on the log CPI. 
 
 
 66 
Table II.1: Housing Intrinsic Value Measures 
Based on the OLS estimation, the residuals are stationary. So under each of the four 
measures, either house price index is cointegrated with the corresponding variables. And each 
measure gives out a method of obtaining housing intrinsic values. 
Dependent Variable: log house price index 
the FHFA's 
HPI 
the Case-Shiller’s 
HPI 
Independent Variable Measure (1) 
1.331*** 3.589***
log construction cost (0.030) (0.181)
-0.054** -2.846***
log consumer price index (0.026) (0.251)
Adj R-Sq 0.99996 0.958
ADF Tau -3.51*** -2.06**
      
Independent Variable Measure (2) 
2.179*** 4.886***
log income (0.211) (0.430)
-0.007** -0.028***
30-year fixed mortgage rate (0.003) (0.010)
-2.681*** -7.469***
log consumer price index -0.368 (0.752)
Adj R-Sq 0.9998 0.999
ADF Tau -3.09*** -1.95**
      
Independent Variable Measure (3) 
0.313*** 0.617
log income (0.116) (0.430)
-0.006** 0.003
30-year fixed mortgage rate (0.003) (0.014)
1.466*** 3.275***
log construction cost (0.078) (0.284)
-0.894*** -3.559***
log consumer price index (0.161) (0.599)
Adj R-Sq 0.994 0.958
ADF Tau -2.24** -2.12**
      
Independent Variable Measure (4) 
1.735*** 8.226***
log rent index (0.257) (0.385)
-0.480 -7.452***
log consumer price index (0.300) -0.392
Adj R-Sq 0.962 0.999
ADF Tau -2.73*** -2.59***
Note: *** represent 1% significance level; ** represent 5% significance level;  
* represents 10% significance level 
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 Figure II.2 demonstrates that, by the second quarter of 2008, the FHFA’s House Price 
Indexes were still overvalued according to all of the five measures, but had different 
magnitudes. In the second quarter of 2008, based on the five measures, the FHFA’s 
House Price Indexes were overvalued in the range of 5-10 percent.  
The starting points of the latest overvaluation period were varied among the 
measures. Among the five measures, the starting points of the latest overvaluation period 
varied from 2003 till 2005. This result could explain why a lot of people investigated 
whether there were house bubbles since 2004. 
During the latest overvaluation period, Measure 2 and 4 display that, in 2006, the 
FHFA’s index was in excess of the intrinsic value by even above 15 percent. However, 
after 2007, the diversities between the five measures have decreased. 
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Figure II.2: Residuals between the Actual Log the FHFA’s HPI and the Fitted Housing Intrinsic 
Values via Five Measures. FittedActualsidual −=Re  . In the second quarter of 2008, based 
on the five measures, the FHFA’s House Price Indexes were overvalued in the range of 5-10 percent. 
The starting points of the latest overvaluation period were varied among the measures. However, 
after 2007, the diversities between the five measures have decreased. 
 
Figure II.3 shows that, at the second quarter of 2008, the Case-Shiller’s House Price 
Index is overvalued only according to Measure 1 and 3, and all of the rest measures 
display an undervalued index. The intrinsic values determined by Measure 1 and 3 
demonstrate that the index began to be undervalued from the fourth quarter of 2006 and 
then began to overvalued since 2008. Measure 2, 4 and 5 exhibit the undervaluation since 
2008. 
As for the recent overvaluation period, According to Measure 1 and 3, the Case-
Shiller’s House Price Index began to be overvalued from the second quarter of 2002. 
Measure 2, 4 and 5 reflect that the Case-Shiller’s House Price Index began to be 
overvalued from the second quarter of 2004.  
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During the latest overvaluation period, the Case-Shiller’s index has been in excess of 
the intrinsic value determined by Measure 2 and 4 by even above 20 percent from the 
third quarter of 2005 till the third quarter of 2006. The maximum excess of the Case-
Shiller’s index over the intrinsic values determined by Measure 5 is about 20 percent in 
the fourth quarter of 2005. 
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Figure II.3: Residual between the Actual Log Case-Shiller’s HPI and the Fitted Housing Intrinsic 
Value via Five Measures. FittedActualsidual −=Re . The intrinsic values determined by 
Measure 1 and 3 demonstrate that the index began to be undervalued from the fourth quarter of 2006 
and then began to overvalued since 2008. Measure 2, 4 and 5 exhibit the undervaluation since 2008. 
 
As we have mentioned before, the diversities between the above results mainly come 
from the statistical differences between the FHFA’s and Case-Shiller’s HPI. Just like that 
it is hard to say which index is better, we can not tell which measure is best to indicate 
the intrinsic house values. Actually, it is more suitable to study all of the indicators in 
order to get a full view of the economy. 
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 II.3. Short Term Adjustment and Housing Dynamics 
The level relationship only reflects a long-term relationship and does not hold at all 
times. House prices would always deviate from their intrinsic values, although there is a 
tendency to move towards the intrinsic values. In this part, we investigate the short run 
relationships and dynamics. 
 
II.3.1. Dynamic Adjustment 
Following Capozza et al. (2002), the short term house price changes (or house price 
return), , may be affected by three parts:  1lnln −−= ttt HHHR
( ) ( )* 1*1* 110 lnlnlnln −−−− −+−++= tttttt HHHHHRHR γβαα .                              (II.6) 
The first item, , refers to the serial correlation (momentum part). It is also called 
“bubble builder”, which has the tendency to build a bubble. 
1−tHR
 The second item, ( )1* 1 lnln −− − tt HH , is the deviation term from the intrinsic value 
and exhibits the partial adjustment to the deviation of house prices from the intrinsic 
values. This term has the tendency to burst the bubble. 
 The third term, ( )* 1* lnln −− tt HH , is the immediate adjustment of the intrinsic values 
and presents the partial adjustment to contemporaneous intrinsic value changes. 
Table II.2 and II.3 record the coefficients on short term dynamics of house price 
returns for the two indices. The coefficients on the lagged house price returns are 
positive, and economically as well as statistically significant. For the FHFA’s index, the 
coefficients are around 0.6, while, for the Case-Shiller’s index, they are around 0.9.  
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The coefficients on the deviation of house prices from the intrinsic values are around 
0.03. Abraham and Hendershott (1996) obtain an estimation of 0.05 for all their 30 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). When the areas are divided into two parts, the 
estimate is 0.10 for the 14 coastal areas versus -0.005 for the 16 inland areas. Our 
estimations are roughly consistent with the previous research. 
The coefficients on the immediate adjustment of the intrinsic values fluctuate a lot 
among different measures, ranging from 0.02 to 0.20. The relatively lower coefficients 
demonstrate that the house market is not an efficient market. 
The empirical results suggest strong serial correlation and slow responses to the 
intrinsic values of house prices. The results are consistent with the previous real estate 
literature. So the house prices would take a long time to converge to their intrinsic values. 
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 Table II.2: Short Term Dynamics of the FHFA’s house price returns 
This short term dynamics of the FHFA’s house price returns are based on equation (II.6) and 
investigate the coefficients on the three parts.  
Dependent Variable: house price return (the FHFA’s index)  
Variable 
Measure 
1 
Measure 
2 
Measure 
3 
Measure 
4 
Measure 
5
0.0023** 0.0034*** 0.0032*** 0.0008 0.0019Intercept 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0012)
0.5742*** 0.6581*** 0.5229*** 0.6969*** 0.6589***lagged house price return 
(0.0790) (0.0771) (0.0730) (0.0781) (0.0752)
0.0352** 0.0198** 0.0689*** 0.0168* 0.0241**deviation from intrinsic value 
(0.0173) (0.0080) (0.0199) (0.0091) (0.0110)
0.2233*** 0.0408 0.2080*** 0.1986* 0.1662***change of intrinsic value 
(0.0613) (0.0289) (0.0440) (0.1053) (0.0623)
Note: *** represent 1% significance level; ** represent 5% significance level; * represents 10% 
significance level 
 
Table II.3: Short Term Dynamics of the Case-Shiller’s house price return 
This short term dynamics of the Case-Shiller’s house price returns are based on equation (II.6) 
and investigate the coefficients on the three parts. 
Dependent Variable: house price return (the Case-Shiller’s index) 
Variable 
Measure 
1 
Measure 
2 
Measure 
3 
Measure 
4 
Measure 
5 
-0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007Intercept 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
0.9241*** 0.9340*** 0.9175*** 0.9587*** 0.9308***lagged house price return 
(0.0491) (0.0406) (0.0481) (0.0395) (0.0414)
0.0115 0.0228*** 0.0138 0.0254*** 0.0305***deviation from intrinsic value 
(0.0101) (0.0060) (0.0101) (0.0076) (0.0092)
0.0778** 0.0189 0.0846*** 0.0333 0.0551change of intrinsic value 
(0.0319) (0.0165) (0.0317) (0.0237) (0.0284)
Note: *** represent 1% significance level; ** represent 5% significance level; * represents 10% 
significance level 
 
II.3.2. Error Correction Models 
The Granger Representation Theorem states that, provided that time series are 
cointegrated, the short-term disequilibrium relationship can always be expressed in the 
error correction form. 
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Following the error correction model (ECM), we could check the effects of other 
variables on the house price returns. 
We consider both the basic economic variables, such as the change of income and the 
change of construction cost, and the mortgage-related variables, such as the change of 
default rate.  
( ) tttttt InfCCIncHHHRHR 32101* 11 lnln γγγγβα +∆+∆++−+= −−−  
           ttttt MarDMRnt εγγγγ ++∆+∆+∆+ 7654 Re                            (II.7) 
tD∆  refers to the change of default rate and the data source is the Mortgage Bankers 
Association (MBA).  stands for the margin, which is the residual of 30-year fixed-
rate mortgage rate deducted by 10-year treasury bond rate.  
tMar
Table II.4 exhibits the regression results on the FHFA’s house price returns. And 
Table II.5 displays the results on the Case-Shiller’s house price returns. 
The coefficients on lagged house price returns and deviations from intrinsic values for 
both the indexes are similar to the coefficients based on equation (II.6). 
As for the other variables, from Table II.4, all the coefficients have the expected 
signs. The change of log rent index, change of log construction cost, and change of log 
income are positively correlated with the FHFA’s house price return. The change of 
mortgage rate, change of default rate, and margin are negatively correlated with the house 
price return. The inflation rates are an adjustment from the nominal variables to the real 
variables and so their sign of coefficients is related with the other variables in the 
equation.  
The regression results on the Case-Shiller’s house price returns have some 
exceptions. The coefficients on the change of income are negative, although they are 
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statistically insignificant. The coefficients on the change of mortgage rate are positive, 
although insignificant. There may exist several reasons. First, the Case-Shiller’s house 
price index is from 1987. Compared between the two periods 1975-2007 and 1987-2007, 
mortgage rate graphs have changed a lot. Especially from 1987 till 2007, the mortgage 
rates had the roughly downward trend. Second, the Case-Shiller’s index has some 
statistical differences from the FHFA’s index, as we mentioned before. Third, the short 
term relations may have some random effects which have impacts on the regression 
results. We chart the two index returns and change of mortgage rate in Figure II.4. It is 
obvious that the FHFA’s house price returns have negative relations with the change of 
mortgage rate, while the Case-Shiller’s house price returns do not, especially for the 
recent few years. 
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 Chart of house price return and change of mortgage rate
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Figure II.4: Chart of the Case-Shiller’s and the FHFA’s house price returns and changes of 
mortgage rates 
This chart is used to compare the relationship between the FHFA’s house price returns and the changes 
of mortgage rate and the relationship between the Case-Shiller’s house price returns and the changes of 
mortgage rate. the FHFA’s house price returns have negative relations with the change of mortgage 
rate, while the Case-Shiller’s house price returns do not, especially for the recent few years. It may 
explain why the coefficient on the change of mortgage rate in equation (II.7) for the Case-Shiller’s 
returns is positive, which is opposite to the coefficient for the FHFA’s returns. 
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Table II.4: House Price (the FHFA’s Index) Dynamics with more variables 
This table exhibits the short term dynamic results based on equation (7). Dependent Variable is the FHFA’s House Price Return. Basically all 
the coefficients have the expected sign. 
Variable  Measure 1 Measure 2  Measure 3 Measure 4 Measure 5 
0.0034 0.0034 0.0044* 0.0043 0.0032Intercept 
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0026)
0.6295*** 0.6159*** 0.5706*** 0.6225*** 0.6253***lagged house price return 
(0.0796) (0.0802) (0.0775) (0.0815) (0.0797)
0.0289* 0.0114 0.0723*** 0.0005 0.0141deviation from intrinsic value 
(0.0172) (0.0084) (0.0204) (0.0102) (0.0125)
change of log rent index --- ---  --- 0.2973 0.3343
     (0.2234) (0.2112)
change of log construction cost 0.2476*** 0.2393*** 0.2536*** 0.2497*** 0.2500***
  (0.0833) (0.0836) (0.0795) (0.0841) (0.0835)
change of log income 0.0202 0.0289 0.0179 0.0059 0.0006
  (0.0650) (0.0657) (0.0621) (0.0678) (0.0675)
inflation rate -0.1292 -0.1661 -0.0953 -0.2081 -0.1761
  (0.1272) (0.1238) (0.0012) (0.1279) (0.1264)
change of mortgage rate -0.0036*** -0.0033*** -0.0039*** -0.0034** -0.0033**
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
change of default rate -0.0100 -0.0063 -0.0062 -0.0110 -0.0063
  (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0105) (0.0117) (0.0116)
margin -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0018
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0016)
***1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
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Table II.5: House Price (the Case-Shiller’s Index) Dynamics with more variables 
This table exhibits the short term dynamic results based on equation (II.7). Dependent Variable is the Case-Shiller’s House Price 
Return. Basically all the coefficients have the expected sign, except the change of mortgage rate. 
  
Variable Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4 Measure 5 
0.0082 0.0122** 0.0081 0.0128** 0.0104*Intercept 
(0.0057) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0052)
0.9568*** 0.8967*** 0.9491*** 0.9076*** 0.8989***lagged house price return 
(0.0556) (0.0516) (0.0561) (0.0501) (0.0528)
0.0028 0.0248*** 0.0079 0.0323*** 0.0346***deviation from intrinsic value 
(0.0104) (0.0060) (0.0106) (0.0074) (0.0094)
0.0031 0.0029 0.0029 0.0032 0.0026change of mortgage rate 
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0021)
0.0968 0.1673 0.1168 0.2164* 0.2143*change of log construction cost 
(0.1375) (0.1207) (0.1375) (0.1214) (0.1262)
-0.4964** -0.3617 -0.4844** -0.5184*** -0.4029**inflation rate 
(0.1923) (0.1751) (0.1911) (0.1697) (0.1770)
-0.0122 -0.0005 -0.0118 -0.0004 -0.0027change of default rate 
(0.0157) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0143) (0.0147)
-0.0034 -0.0064 -0.0034 -0.0064* -0.0054*margin 
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0032)
***1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
II.4. Overshooting 
Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Capozza et al. (2002) have argued that the 
inefficiency in the housing market may cause house price returns in some areas to 
significantly “overshoot” the fundamental values.  
One famous overshooting model was built by Rudiger Dornbusch (1976). In 
Dornbusch’s model, assuming rigidity of domestic prices, an unanticipated permanent 
increase in money supply will cause the initial depreciation of the exchange rate to be 
larger than long-run depreciation. That is, the exchange rate must overshoot first in order 
for the ensuing appreciation to clear bond and money markets. 
The “overshooting” concept in housing market means that, if house price returns are 
overvalued compared with the fundamental values (determined by the intrinsic values of 
house prices), they may be adjusted to a level lower than the fundamental values first, 
and then back to the fundamental values gradually. In order to be “overshot”, the mutual 
functions of serial correlation term and deviation term from the intrinsic values are 
needed. Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Capozza et al (2002) have utilized 
simulation methods to obtain the overshooting path and the rough combination of the two 
terms. In this paper, we will try to derive the rough range of the coefficients to 
“overshoot” and clarify the role of each term. 
 
II.4.1. Case 1 
First assume the intrinsic value of house prices is constant over time, that is 
. This is the simplest case. Then the house price return would be 
obtained from the following equation, transformed from equation (II.6): 
cHH t == ** lnln
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 ( ) tttt HcHRHR εβα +−+= −− 11 ln                          
        23t
t
i
it HRHR εβα +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+= ∑−
=
−
1
1
1 .                                                              (II.8) 
Suppose there is a shock 10 =ε (unit) (e.g. 10 percent) at time 0, so that 
(unit) and all the rest innovations are zero. We could check the impacts on  
through the serial correlation term and the deviation term. Table II.6 exhibits the impulse 
response functions
10 =HR tHR
24 for  expressed by α and β. Table II.7 displays the range of β for 
some α’s in order to overshoot at the specific time period
tHR
25. In Table II.7, we select 5 
scenarios: 1.0=α , 5.0=α , 6.0=α , 7.0=α , and 9.0=α . 
 
Table II.6: the impulse response functions for  tHR
 Suppose there is a shock 10 =ε (unit) at time 0 and all the rest innovations are zero.  
The impulse response functions for  are expressed by α and β. tHR
Period t tHR  
1 βα −  
2 ( ) ββα −− 2  
3 ( ) ( )βαβββα −−−− 23  
4 ( ) ( ) ( )βαββββαββα −−+−−−− 23 224  
5 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22235 22334 βββαββαββαββαββα +−−−−+−−−−−  
6 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 32222
2346
326
2345
ββββαββαβ
βαββαββαββαββα
−+−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−
 
 
                                                 
23We assume   ∑∑
==
+=+=
t
i
i
t
i
it HRcHRHH
11
0lnln
24 Impulse-response functions are built on vector autocorrelation regression (VAR) and describe the 
response of one variable to a one-time shock. So they could be utilized to measure the persistence and 
magnitude of a previous shock. Please check Hamilton (1994) as a reference. 
25 We may regard this period as one quarter in order to be consistent with our previous estimation. 
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From Table II.7, we could find that, basically with the increase of α, β should increase 
correspondingly in order to get “overshooting”. For a specific α, the higher β is, the 
earlier “overshooting” occurs. 
 
Table II.7: the possible combinations of α and β for the occurrence of overshooting at each period26
 
This table displays the range of β for some α’s in order to overshoot at the specific time period. 5 scenarios 
are selected: 1.0=α , 5.0=α , 6.0=α , 7.0=α and 9.0=α . 
 1.0=α  5.0=α  6.0=α  7.0=α  9.0=α  
t=1 β<1.0  β<5.0  β<6.0  β<7.0  β<9.0  
t=2 β<008.0  β<134.0  β<178.0  β<225.0  β<328.0  
t=3 844.0001.0 << β  β<048.0  β<072.0  β<099.0   β<162.0  
t=4 β<0001.0  β<020.0  β<033.0  β<049.0  β<089.0  
t=5 
608.00 << β  or 
β<944.0  500.0009.0 << β  525.0017.0 <<β  559.0028.0 << β  642.0061.0 <<β  
t=6 
257.00 << β  or 
β<767.0  
452.0004.0 << β 519.0009.0 << β
 
592.0016.0 << β  753.0039.0 << β  
 
 
Figure II.5 and II.7 display the different paths of house price returns with variable α 
and β. With the same β and the higher α, “overshooting” occurs relatively later and its 
magnitude is enlarged, which shows the strong momentum effects. For example, if 
1.0=α  and 03.0=β , the house price return becomes negative at period 2 and the lowest 
return is -0.03 unit at period 3. If 9.0=α  and 03.0=β , the house price returns are 
positive until period 7 and the lowest return is -0.5 unit at period 14. Hence the strong 
momentum term will impede the mean reversion process.  
With the same α and the higher β, “overshooting” occurs relatively earlier and house 
price returns move back to the equilibrium value more quickly, which shows the strong 
                                                 
26 Theoretically  β is expected to be in the range [0,1]. Empirically β may also be less than 0. Abraham and 
Hendershott (1996) obtained 005.0−=β  for the sample of 16 inland. Basically 0<β  means that this 
deviation term strengthens the momentum effect. So we assume β is always in [-1,1]. 
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mean reversion (bubble buster) effects. Figure II.5 exhibits that, for 6.0=α  and 
09.0=β , house price returns “overshoot” since the third quarter27 and are almost back to 
the equilibrium value after about 4 years. While, for 6.0=α  and 01.0=β , house price 
returns begin to overshoot from the sixth quarters and need at least 10 years to be almost 
back to the equilibrium value. The higher β also augments “overshooting” magnitude. 
Figure II.5 demonstrates that the lowest returns for 01.0=β , 03.0=β , and 09.0=β  are  
-0.05 unit at period 14, -0.12 unit at period 9, and -0.25 unit at period 6, respectively. 
Figure II.6 and II.8 exhibit the different paths of house prices with variable α and β. 
Based on our assumption, house prices should go back toward their intrinsic values, 
which is one here. Before reaching the intrinsic value, different parameters determine 
variety of paths. In the most possible case 6.0=α  and 03.0=β , for a 10 percent shock 
of house price return at time 0, the house prices appreciate 22 percent after 1.25 years and 
then last about another 7 years to move back to the reasonable range around the intrinsic 
value. For 6.0=α  and 01.0=β , the house prices obtain a 25 percent bubble after about 
1.5 years and then the bubble bursts slowly. For 6.0=α  and 09.0=β , the house prices 
only magnify by 18 percent and are back to the intrinsic value after about 3 years. 
From Figure II.8, it can be found that, with the same β and the higher α, the house 
price would form the bigger bubble and then move back to the intrinsic value quicker. 
Under the extreme situation 9.0=α , after first reaching the intrinsic value, house prices 
would even continue to go down. 
Above all, both α and β magnify the magnitude of “overshooting” for house price 
returns. However, α tends to delay the occurrence of overshooting, while β tends to speed 
                                                 
27 We assume each simulation tick is one quarter. 
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it up. Due to the mean reversion effects of higher β, even if the magnitude for house price 
returns to “overshoot” is increased, the house price bubble may not be expanded. 
 
II.4.2. Case 2 
Now we assume the intrinsic values of house prices increase with a constant number 
over time, that is . Then, based on equation (II.6), the house 
price returns under the dynamic adjustment would become: 
cHRHH ttt ==− − ** 1* lnln
 ( ) tttttt HRHHHRHR εγβα ++−+= −−− *1* 11 lnln  
        .                                                (II.9) ( ) ttt
i
iit HRHRHRHR εγβα ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ∑−
=
−
*
1
1
*
1
Suppose there is a shock 100 =ε  percent at time 0 and all the rest innovations are 
zero. Assume  percent. It is needed to be clarified that “overshooting” means that 
the actual house price returns are less than  and not necessarily less than zero. Figure 
II.9-II.14 demonstrate the impacts of variable parameters on house price returns and 
house prices. 
1* =tHR
*HR
Comparing Figure II.7 and II.9, we could see that the occurrence time of 
“overshooting” is similar. The one with less α still “overshoots” earlier. Figure II.11 
displays similar results as Figure II.5 
Figure II.10 and II.12 demonstrate that the appreciation magnitude of house prices 
becomes smaller, compared with the situations of Figure II.8 and II.6. For example, when 
6.0=α  and 03.0=β , for a 10 percent shock of house price return at time 0, the house 
price appreciates 8 percent, instead of 22 percent, after 1 years. 
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Figure II.13 and II.14 exhibit the effects of γ’s. As γ becomes smaller, overshooting 
occurs earlier and the magnitudes are higher. We may regard γ as a criterion reflecting 
the efficiency of house market, so that greater γ stands for more efficiency. Then efficient 
market will have less overshooting phenomenon. Under the efficient market, house price 
will change quickly back to the intrinsic value. 
 
II.5. Conclusion 
This paper presents the possible measures of the intrinsic values of house prices, 
which stand for the long run equilibrium. Different measures may give different 
conclusions on whether the house prices are undervalued or overvalued in some specific 
period. At least from these estimations, we could learn when the over-price or under-
price problem should be paid attention to.  
As for the short term adjustment, the serial correlation term and deviation term from 
the intrinsic value play an important role on the dynamics of house price return. 
Due to the inefficiency of housing market, house price returns may “overshoot”. The 
timing and magnitude of “overshooting” highly depend on the coefficients of the three 
terms. 
As for the further research, the intrinsic value and short term dynamics of local house 
prices should be investigated.  
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Simulation of House Price Return
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Figure II.5: Simulation of House Price Return Paths with the same α and different β’s 
With the same α and the higher β, “overshooting” occurs relatively earlier and house price 
returns move back to the equilibrium value more quickly, which shows the strong mean 
reversion (bubble buster) effects. The higher β also augments “overshooting” magnitude. 
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Figure II.6: Simulation of House Price Paths with the same α and different β’s 
With the same α and the higher β, the house price would form the smaller bubble and then move 
back to the intrinsic value quicker. 
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Simulation of House Price Returns
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Figure II.7: Simulation of House Price Return Paths with the same β and different α’s 
With the same β and the higher α, “overshooting” occurs relatively later and its magnitude is 
enlarged, which shows the strong momentum effects. 
 
Simulation of House Price
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
1.45
1.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49Quarter
alpha=0.1 beta=0.03
alpha=0.5 beta=0.03
alpha=0.6 beta=0.03
alpha=0.7 beta=0.03
alpha=0.9 beta=0.03
 
Figure II.8: Simulation of House Price Paths with the same β and different α’s 
With the same β and the higher α, the house price would form the bigger bubble and then move 
back to the intrinsic value quicker. 
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Figure II.9: Simulation of House Price Return Paths with the same β, γ and different α’s 
The results are similar with Figure II.7. With the same β and the higher α, “overshooting” 
occurs relatively later and its magnitude is enlarged. 
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Figure II.10: Simulation of House Price Paths with the same β, γ and different α’s 
This figure demonstrates that the appreciation magnitude of house prices becomes smaller, 
compared with Figure II.8. 
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Figure II.11: Simulation of House Price Return Paths with the same α, γ and different β’s 
The results are similar with Figure II.7. With the same α and the higher β, “overshooting” 
occurs relatively earlier and house price returns move back to the equilibrium value more 
quickly. The higher β also augments “overshooting” magnitude. 
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Figure II.12: Simulation of House Price Paths with the same α, γ and different β’s 
This figure demonstrates that the appreciation magnitude of house prices becomes smaller, 
compared with Figure II.6. 
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Figure II.13: Simulation of House Price Returns with the same α, β and different γ’s 
As γ becomes smaller, overshooting occurs earlier and the magnitudes are higher, which reflects 
a less efficient house market. 
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Figure II.14: Simulation of House Prices with the same α, β and different γ’s 
As γ becomes greater, house prices change quickly back to the intrinsic values, which reflects a 
higher efficient house market. 
 89
Chapter II References 
Abraham, Jesse, and Bill Schauman. (1991). “Evidence on House Prices from FHLEC 
Repeat Sales”, Journal of the AREUEA 19, 333-352. 
Abraham, Jesse, and Patric H. Hendershott. (1992). “Patterns and Determinants of  
Metropolitan House Prices, 1977-91”, NBER working paper. 
Abraham, Jesse, and Patric H. Hendershott. (1996). “Bubbles in Metropolitan Housing 
Markets”, Journal of Housing Research, 7(2), 191-207 
Ambrose, Brent, Richard Buttimer, Jr. and Charles Capone. (1997). “Pricing Mortgage 
Default and Foreclosure Delay”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, 314-325. 
Ambrose, Brent and Michael LaCour-Little. (2001). “Prepayment Risk in Adjustable 
Rate Mortgages Subject to Initial Year Discounts: Some New Evidence”, Real Estate 
Economics, 29, 305-327 
Ambrose, Brent, Charles A. Capone, JR. and Yongheng Deng. (2001). “Optimal Put 
Exercise: An Empirical Examination of Conditions for Mortgage Foreclosure”, 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 23:2, 213-234. 
Ang, Andrew and Monika Piazzesi (2003). “A No-arbitrage Vector Autoregression of 
Term Structure Dynamics with Macroeconomic and Latent Variables”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 50, 745-787. 
Ayuso, Juan and Fernando Restoy (2006). “House Prices and Rents: An Equilibrium 
asset pricing approach”, Journal of Empirical Finance, 13, 371-388. 
Black, Angela, Patrica Fraser and Martin Hoesli (2006). “House Prices, Fundamentals 
and Bubbles”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 33, 1535-1555. 
Bourassa, Steven C, Patric H. Hendershott and James Murphy (2001). “Further Evidence 
on the Existence of Housing Market Bubbles”, Journal of Property Research, 18:1, 1-
19. 
Cagan, Christopher. (2007). “Mortgage Payment Reset: the issue and the impact”, 
www.loanperformance.com. 
Calhoun, Charles and Yongheng Deng. (2002) “A Dynamic Analysis of Fixed- and 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Terminations”, Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 24, 9-33. 
Capozza, Deninis, and Robert Helsley. (1989) “The Fundamentals of Land Prices and 
Urban Growth”, Journal of Urban Economics, 26, 295-306. 
Capozza, Deninis, and Robert Helsley. (1990) “The Stochastic City”, Journal of Urban 
Economics, 28, 187-203. 
Capozza, Dennis, Patric H. Hendershott, Charlotte Mack, and Christopher J. Mayer. 
(2002). “Determinants of Real House Price Dynamics”, NEBR working paper, 
available at http://www/nber.org/papers/w9262
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller. (1987). “Prices of Single-Family Homes Since 1970: 
New Indexes for Four Cities”, New England Economics Review, Sept. /Oct., 45-56. 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller. (1989). “The Efficiency of the Market for Single-
Family Homes”, American Economic Review, 79, 125-137. 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller. (1990). “Forecasting Prices and Excess Returns in the 
Housing Market”, AREUEA Journal, 18, 253-273. 
 90 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller. (2003). “A Decade of Boom and Bust in the Prices of 
Single-Family Homes: Boston and Los Angeles, 1983 to 1993”, New England 
Economic Review, March. 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller. (2003). “Is there a Bubble in the Housing Market”, 
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 2., 299-362. 
Case, Karl E., Robert J. Shiller and Allan N. Weiss. (1995). “Mortgage Default Risk and 
Real Estate Prices: the Use of Index-based Futures and Options in Real Estate”, 
NBER Working. 
Cox, John, Jonathan Ingersoll, and Stephen Ross. (1985). “A Theory of the Term 
Structure of Interest Rates”, Econometrica, 53, 358-407. 
Dai, Qiang and Kenneth J. Singleton. (2000) “Specification Analysis of Affine Term 
Structure Models”, Journal of Finance, 55, 1943-1978. 
Deng, Yongheng. (1997). “Mortgage Termination: An Empirical Hazard Model with a 
Stochastic Term Structure”, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 14, 309-
331 
Deng, Yongsheng, John M. Quigley, and Robert Van Order. (2000). “Mortgage 
Terminations, Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options”, Econometrica 
68, 275-307. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger. (1976). “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics”, Journal of 
Political Economics, 84, 1161-1176 
Dunn, Kenneth and John McConnell. (1981). “Valuation of GNMA Mortgage-Backed 
Securities”, Journal of Finance, 36, 599-615 
Edelstein, Robert and Desmond Tsang (2007). “Dynamic Residential Housing Cycles 
Analysis”,  Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 35, 295-313. 
Engle, Robert and C. W. J. Granger (1987). “Co-Integration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing”,  Econometica, 55, 251-276. 
Emrath, Paul, (2005), “Interest Rates and House Prices: the “Priced Out” Effect”, 
National Association of Home Builders, available at 
http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=37153
Epperson, James, James Kau, Donald Keenan, and Walter Muller. (1985). “Pricing 
Default Risk in Mortgages”, Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban 
Economics Association, 13, 261-272 
Fama, Eugene, and Kenneth French. (1988). “Permanent and Temporary Components of 
Stock Prices”, the Journal of Political Economy, 96, 246-273 
Hamilton, James (1994). “Time Series Analysis”, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Harrington, Scott and Tong Yu. (2003). “Do Property-Casualty Insurance Underwriting 
Margins Have Unit Roots”, the Journal of Risk and Insurance, 70, 715-733. 
Himmerlberg, Charles, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai. (2005). “Assessing High 
House Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals, and Misperceptions”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Staff Reports. 
Hott, Christian and Pierre Monnin. (2008). “Fundamental Real Estate Prices: An 
Empirical Estimation with International Data”, Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 36, 427-450 
Houston, Joel, J. Sa-Aadu, and James Shilling. (1991). “Teaser Rates in Conventional 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgage (ARM) Markets”, Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 4, 19-31 
 91
Kau, James, Donald Keenan, Walter Muller and James Epperson. (1990). “The Valuation 
and Analysis of Adjustable Rate Mortgages”, Management Science, 36, 1417-1431. 
Kau, James, Donald Keenan, Walter Muller and James Epperson. (1992). “A Generalized 
Valuation Model for Fixed-Rate Residential Mortgages”, Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking 24, 279-299.  
Kau, James, Donald Keenan, Walter Muller and James Epperson. (1993). “Optional 
Theory and Floating-Rate Securities with a Comparison of Adjustable- and Fixed-
Rate Mortgages”, the Journal of Business, 66, 595-618. 
Kau, James, Donald Keenan, Walter Muller and James Epperson. (1995). “The Valuation 
at Origination of Fixed Rate Mortgages with Default and Prepayment”, Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 11, 5-36 
Kelly, Austin. (2007). “Zero Down Payment Mortgage Default”, MPRA Paper, online at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4318
MaCarthy, Jonathan and Richard W. Peach. (2002). “Monetary Policy Transmission to 
Residential Investment”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy 
Review, 8, No.1(May), 139-158 
MaCarthy, Jonathan and Richard W. Peach. (2004). “Are Home Prices the Next 
‘Bubble’?”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, December, 
1-17 
MaCarthy, Jonathan and Richard W. Peach. (2005). “Is There a ‘Bubble’ in the Housing 
Market Now?”, working paper. 
Madsen, Chris and Hal Pedersen. (2002). “An Examination of Insurance Pricing and 
Underwriting Cycles”, working paper. 
Meissner, Chris and Stephen Satchell. (2007). “A Comparision of the Case-Shiller House 
Price Index Methodology with the FT House Price Index Methodology”, available 
from www.acadametrics.co.uk. 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. (2007) “News Release”, the second 
quarter, http://www.ofheo.gov/media/hpi/2q07hpi.pdf
Ong, Seow Eng, Tien Foo Sing and Alan Hwee Loon Teo. (2007) “Delinquency and 
Default in ARMs: the Effects of Protected Equity and Loss Aversion”, Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 35, 253-280. 
Pearson, Neil D. and Tong-Sheng Sun. (1994). “Exploiting the Conditional Density in 
Estimating the Term Structure: an Application to the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross Model”, 
Journal of Finance, 54, 1279-1304. 
Poterba, James M. and Lawrence H. Summers. (1988). “Mean Reversion in Stock 
Prices”, Journal of Financial Economics, 22, 27-59. 
Quigley, John M. and Robert Van Order. (1995). “Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims 
Models of Mortgage Default”, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 11, 99-
117. 
Risbjerg, Lars. (2006). “Money Growth, Inflation and the Business Cycle”, Denmarks 
Nationalbank: Monetary Review, 3rd Quarter, 23-35 
Rogoff, Kenneth. (2002). “Dornbusch’s Overshooting Model After Twenty-Five Years”, 
Second Annual Research Conference, International Monetary Fund Mundell-Fleming 
Lecture 
 92 
Schwartz, Eduardo, and Walter Torous (1993). “Mortgage Prepayment and Default 
Decisions: a Poisson Regression Approach”, Journal of the American Real Estate and 
Urban Economics Association, 21, 431-449. 
Shiller, Robert J (1990) "Speculative Prices and Popular Models", Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Spring, 55-65. 
Shiller, Robert J (2007) "Low Long-term Interest Rates and High Asset Prices", for 
“Celebration of BPEA”. 
Standard & Poor’s (2008). “S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices Methodology”, 
available from www.standardandpoors.com. 
Tian, Yisong. (1992) "A Simplified Binomial Lattice Approach to the Pricing of Interest-
Rate Contingent Claims", Journal of Financial Engineering 1:1, 14-37. 
Vandell, Kerry. (1993). “Handing Over the Keys: a Perspective on Mortgage Default 
Research”, Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, 
21, 211-246. 
Weaver, Karen and Katie Reeves. (2007). “The Impact of Underwriting Subprime ARMs 
at the Fully Indexed Rate: An Analysis of Debt-to-Income Ratios”, Market Pulse, 
Mar. 
 
 
 
 93
 Chapter III Bond Insurers: Avoiding Capital Pro-
cyclicality 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter describes the business features of bond insurers and the impacts of 
business cycles on them. A structural model with time-varying correlations, which are 
closely tied up with the business cycle, is adopted. When deriving the total loss 
distribution and economic capital for a bond insurer, we consider losses due to bond 
insurers’ downgrading, and losses from both insurance contracts and investment 
portfolio. On that basis, we propose forward-looking smoothing rules of capital over a 
full business cycle, instead of only based on a short-term horizon, to avoid the 
procyclicality. The simulation results show the smoothed capital may vary from lower 
degree of procyclicality to totally counter-cyclicality, corresponding to the different 
parameter values. With the smoothed capital, a bond insurer can actually establish some 
capital buffer in good times to support the potential losses in crisis. 
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III.1. Introduction 
Bond insurers28, operated as monoline insurers since 1989, were some of the first 
financial institutions affected by the financial crisis beginning in 2007. As a result, credit 
rating agencies began downgrading most of the bond insurers. This triggered serious 
problems for bond insurers. Bond insurers essentially rented their AAA credit ratings to 
lower-rated debt. Without such ratings, not to mention the extreme difficulty for them to 
get new business, the value decrease of all the currently insured bonds would need higher 
loss reserve and capital from bond insurers. It is crucial to make sure bond insurers have 
enough capital to cover the potential losses.  
One important feature of bond insurers is that their business is very sensitive to the 
business cycle. The bonds have the tendency to have higher correlations with each other 
in deep recession (crisis), so systemic economic shocks may have serious impacts on 
bond insurers. In order to keep their ratings, bond insurers need more capital in credit 
crisis, which may worsen their financial conditions further. Therefore, their capital 
requirements may be even more pro-cyclical. 
Many aspects of credit insurance have been addressed in the literature, such as 
Merton (1977) and Gendron et al. (2006b). Especially, Lai and Soumare (2010) analyze 
the effects of time-varying correlations and loan maturities on the risk-based capital that 
backed credit insurance portfolios. Drake and Neale (2010) examine four primary risk 
                                                 
28 Bond insurers are also called "financial guaranty insurance companies" or "financial guarantors". 
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exposures and the failings of the regulatory framework of these insurers. The pro-
cyclicality of bond insurers’ capital requirements has not been sufficiently investigated. 
Plenty of papers examined the pro-cyclicality problem in other areas. Andritzky et al. 
(2009) discuss policies to mitigate pro-cyclicality in private sector risk management and 
regulation.  
The pro-cyclicality problem in the new Basel Accord is widely discussed, such as 
Ervin and Wilde (2001), Cosandey and Wolf (2002), Purhonen (2002), Kashyap and 
Stein (2004), Gordy and Howells (2006), and Repullo et al. (2009). Kashyap and Stein 
(2004) point out that the target solvency probability in the regulatory rule should be time-
varying over the cycle. Gordy and Howells (2006) explore several smoothing rules for 
capital. Repullo et al. (2009) assess the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a 
dynamic equilibrium model.  
In the area of bank loan loss reserves, since 2007, the Spanish model of dynamic 
provisioning has attracted attention, since it is regarded a countercyclical tool, compared 
with the prevailing incurred loss model. The papers include Balla and McKenna (2009) 
and Saurina (2009). 
Our purpose is to examine the interaction between bond insurers’ operations and 
financial crisis, and propose smoothing rules for bond insurers’ capital calculation in 
order to avoid the procyclicality. We use a structural model with some extensions. Our 
paper is characterized in the following aspects: (1) time-varying bond correlations are 
defined over cycle, which is in line with Lai and Soumare (2010). (2) The business cycles 
represented by bond yield spread are identified, using the approximate band-pass filters 
proposed by Baxer and King (1999), since bond insurers’ operations heavily depend on 
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credit market. So we can classify the economy as crisis and non-crisis. (3) We analyze 
the impacts of bond insurers’ downgrades on bond values and incorporate them into the 
total losses of bond insurers. (4) The losses on both insurance contracts and investment 
portfolios are considered. (5) We propose forward-looking smoothing rules of capital 
over a full business cycle, instead of only based on a short-term horizon. The simulation 
results show the effects of changing parameter values in smoothing rules. The smoothed 
capital may vary from lower degree of procyclicality to totally counter-cyclicality, 
corresponding to the different parameter values. With the smoothed capital, a bond 
insurer can actually establish some capital buffer in good times to support the potential 
losses in crisis. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section III.2 provides an overview of 
bond insurance industry. Section III.3 presents the model. Section III.4 identifies business 
cycle, using bond yield spread index. Section III.5 presents our simulation results. 
Section III.6 discusses the related references to establish contingent capital buffer. 
Section III.7 is the conclusion. 
 
III.2. Bond Insurance Industry: Overview 
In a bond insurance business, a bond issuer pays premiums to a bond insurer and 
obtains insurance from a bond insurer. As a result, in the event that the bond issuer 
defaults, the bond insurer will provide interest and principal repayments as specified. Its 
important effect is that the rating of the bond is raised to the rating of the bond insurer. 
Therefore a bond insurer must have almost perfect credit rating accordingly. 
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Table III.1 lists the main events occurred in the bond insurance industry. Since the 
establishment of the first bond insurer in 1971, bond insurers first focused on insurance 
on public finance. Later in the 1990s, the bond insurers were involved with structured 
financial products, such as mortgage-based Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). The 
involvement grew quite large by the early 2000s. Drake and Neale (2010) shows that 
nowadays bond insurers mainly offer four types of credit enhancement: 
1. insurance on public finance 
2. insurance on structured finance 
3. credit default swaps (CDS) 
4. guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) 
According to the annual reports of bond insurers, insurance on public finance 
includes General Fund Obligation, Municipal Utilities, Transportation, Health Care, 
Higher Education, Municipal Housing, and other financing bonds.  
Insurance on structured finance includes Collateralized Debt Obligations, Mortgage-
Backed Residential, Mortgage-Backed Commercial, Consumer Asset Backed, and 
Corporate Asset Backed securities.  
Credit Default Swaps are generally provided for protection on structured finance. 
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Table III.1: Significant events in the bond insurance industry 
Source: Drake and Neale (2010): Financial Guarantee Insurance and the Failures in Risk Management 
Year Company events Bond insurance events 
1971 American Municipal Bond Assurance Corp. 
(AMBAC), the first bond insurer, established by 
MGIC 
 
1973 Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA) 
created 
 
1982 Baldwin-United buys MGIC (including AMBAC 
subsidiary) 
 
1983 Financial Guarantee Insurance Company (FGIC) 
formed 
Default of $2.25 billion Washington Public Power System 
bonds, insured by AMBAC.  
Baldwin-United (parent to AMBAC) goes bankrupt. 
1985 Financial Security Assurance (FSA) founded 
Bond Insurance Guarantee founded 
Citicorp acquires AMBAC 
 
1986 Capital Guarantee founded Financial Guaranty Insurance Model Act of 1986 passed by 
NAIC. 
1988 FGIC acquired by General Electric Capital 25% of municipal bonds insured. 
1989 FSAs acquired by US West 
Bond Insurance Guarantee (BIG) acquired by MBIA 
New York implements law that financial guarantors must be 
monoline insurers and meet minimum capital requirements. 
1991 AMBAC spun off by Citicorp  
1994  Averted crisis in bond market with Orange County bonds. 
NYSID 29  issues letter stating that synthetic guaranteed 
investment contracts are prohibited. 
1995 FSA acquires Capital Guarantee NYSID enables the monocline bond insurers to write 
insurance on Guaranteed Investment Contracts. 
1997 American Capital Access (ACA) Financial 
Guarantee Corporation formed 
NYSID allows monoline bond insurers to participate in credit 
default swaps. 
1998 Capital Markets Assurance Corp. acquired by MBIA  
1999 CMAC merged with Amerin, forming Radian NYSID issues letter clarifying that insolvency, payment 
default or downgrade of a security’s credit rating are payment 
triggers under a CDS. 
2000 FSA acquired by Groupe Dexia. 
XL Capital Assurance Inc., started in 2000 by XL 
Capital Ltd. 
40% of municipal bonds insured. 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, H.R. 5660, passes 
leaving the credit default market generally unregulated. 
2001 CDCI IXIS Financial Guarantee (CIFG) founded as 
a subsidiary of Caisse des Depots 
 
2002 CIFG founded NYSID withdraws prohibition on synthetic guaranteed 
investment contracts. 
2004  54% of municipal bonds insured. 
The New York Department of Insurance revises the insurance 
code to redefine “asset-backed securities” to allow policies 
on CDS securities and pools. 
2006 PMI Guarantee founded  
2007 Berkshire Hathaway establishes Berkshire 
Hathaway Assurance 
 
2008 Assured Guarantee acquires FSA. Majority of bond insurers lose triple-A rating. 
2009 MBIA restructures and renames MBIA Insurance 
Corp. of Illinois to National Public Finance 
Guarantee Corporation, to focus on U.S. public 
finance. 
Significant restrictions imposed by the New York State 
Insurance Department on financial guarantee insurers go into 
effect including limitations on the sale of guarantees and 
insurance on CDS. 
Majority of bond insurers rated below investment grade (less 
than BBB). 
 
 
                                                 
29 NYSID means “the New York State Insurance Department”. 
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In 1995 the New York State Insurance Department (NYSID) enabled the bond 
insurers to write insurance on GICs. Here is a description on a GIC mentioned in Drake 
and Neale (2010). Not all the funds (obtained through a municipal bond issuance) are 
needed at once. The temporary spare part could be deposited in a GIC (most probably 
operated by a bond insurer’s investment management subsidiary), which promises a 
higher rate of return than in a money market account. The bond insurer generally invests 
the funds and makes profit on the difference between what it actually earns and the 
promised return paid out. For this product, it is crucial for bond insurers to maintain a 
good rating. Once a bond insurer with GIC is downgraded, the bond insurer may be 
required to post collateral for the GIC or pay to terminate the agreement, resulting in a 
significant loss of liquidity for the bond insurer. 
Table III.2 displays MBIA corp.’s net par amount written by different products at the 
end of 2006, 2007 and 2008. We may find that the insurance products on structured 
finance and credit default swaps peak as of the end of 2007.  
 
Table III.2: MBIA Corp. --Net Par Amount Written by Products (in billions) 
 12/31/2006 12/31/2007 12/31/2008 
US Public Finance $46.4 $54.1 $195.1  
Non-US Public Finance $6.9 $5.5 $1.5  
US Structured Finance $39.8 $73.8 $6.9  
Non-US Structured Finance $19.1 $14.6 $3.4  
Credit Default Swaps (notional value) $139.7 $200.4 $167.9  
Data source: MBIA’s annual reports 
Note: In its annual reports, there is no detailed amount on GIC. 
 
Bond insurers not only provide insurance for public and structured finance, but also 
invest in public and structured finance insured by the same or other bond insurers. For 
example, in MBIA’s 2008 annual report, it is stated that  
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MBIA.’s “investment portfolio includes investments that are insured by MBIA 
Corp.(“MBIA Insured Investments”). As of December 31, 2008, MBIA Insured 
Investments at fair value represented $3.5 billion or 17% of the total investment 
portfolio.” 
Table III.3 exhibits MBIA’s self-insured investment at fair value and its percentage in 
total investment at the end of 2006, 2007 and 2008. MBIA kept a relatively constant 
percentage of self-insured investment in its total investment.  
Bond insurers also invest in the bonds insured by other bond insurers. We cannot get 
the exact proportion for that part of investment, based on their annual report. 
 
Table III.3: MBIA Corp. --Self-insured Investment at fair value 
in billions 2006 2007 2008
Self-insured Investment  $6.8 $6.8 $3.5 
Percentage in Total Investment 18% 16% 17%
Data source: MBIA’s annual reports 
 
Before 2007 few bond insurers had been downgraded. Almost all of them had the best 
credit ratings. They usually ran their business largely unnoticed. In 2007, due to 
downgrading originally high quality subprime structured securities, the deteriorating 
condition of bond insurers started to attract attention. Table III.4 shows the major bond 
insurers’ ratings30 as of February 24, 2010, compared with the ones as of Jun 5, 2007. 
Their credit ratings have been deteriorated rapidly.  
 
 
                                                 
30 Before 1990, there were 'big four' bond insurers (AMBAC, MBIA Insurance Corporation, Financial 
Guaranty Insurance Company and FSA). In the late 90s/2000s a few more came up, for example ACA 
Financial Guaranty Corp, XL Capital, and CIFG. 
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Table III.4: Bond Insurer Ratings 
as of February 24, 2010 
(initial ratings/outlooks as on 6/5/07) 
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Fitch Bond Insurer (Stock Ticker) 
Date Rating Date Rating Date Rating 
ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. (ACA)  NR 6/5/07 
12/15/08 
A- 
W 
 NR 
Ambac (Ambac Assurance 
Corporation) (ABK) 
6/5/07 
7/29/09 
Aaa 
Caa2 
 
6/5/07 
11/18/09 
AAA 
CC+ 
6/5/07 
6/26/08 
AAA 
W 
CIFG 6/5/07 
11/11/09 
Aaa 
W 
6/5/07 
2/16/10 
AAA 
W 
6/5/07 
10/21/08 
AAA 
W 
FGIC (Financial Guaranty Insurance 
Co.) 
6/5/07 
4/14/09 
Aaa 
W 
6/5/07 
4/22/09 
AAA 
W 
6/5/07 
11/24/08 
AAA 
W 
National Re (National Public Finance 
Guarantee, (formerly MBIA) (MBI) 
6/5/07 
6/25/09 
Aaa 
Baa1 
6/5/07 
9/28/09 
AAA 
A 
6/5/07 
6/26/08 
AAA 
W 
Syncora Guarantee Inc. (formerly XL 
Capital Assurance Inc.) (SCA) 
6/5/07 
3/9/09 
Aaa 
Ca 
6/5/07 
4/27/09 
AAA 
R 
6/5/07 
9/5/08 
AAA 
W 
Note: NR means “Not Rated”; W means “Rating Withdrawn”; R means “Regulatory Action”. 
Source: Stone & Youngberg LLC 
 
 
The credit downgrade of bond insurers may cause a series of effects and worsen the 
credit crunch. Chart III.1 describes the cycle graphically.  
Step 1: The downgrade of part of the insured bonds’ ratings due to rising defaults 
may worsen the bond insurers’ financial situations and cause downward rating 
adjustments of the bond insurers. 
Cycle 1: 
Step 2(1): As a result, all the insured bonds’ ratings are reduced. 
Step 3 (1): The losses and loss reserves are increased correspondingly. It not only 
happens to the insurance portfolio, but also the investment portfolio, especially the 
one by the (same or other) bond insurers. 
Step 4 (1): It further deteriorates the bond insurers’ ratings. 
Cycle 2: 
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Step 2 (2): As a result, all the insured bonds’ ratings are reduced. 
Step 3 (2): The new issuance of public and structured finance is then decreased.  
Step 4 (2): With rising claims and no new revenues, the market share and capital of 
bond insurers are lowered. 
Step 5 (2): It further deteriorates the bond insurers’ ratings. 
 
 
 
Step 6: Besides, the downward ratings of all the insured bonds and less new issuance 
will have a knock-on effect on other financial institutions that rely on bond insurers’ 
guarantees, which will further worsen the credit crunch.  
In this chapter, we analyze the possible losses due to bonds’ default and bond 
insurers’ downgrading for currently issued bonds. Then we figure out smoothing rules for 
capital. 
 
Part of insured 
bond ratings 
reduced
Bond insurers 
rating reduced 
All the insured 
bond ratings 
reduced
More losses 
occurred 
Credit Market 
Other financial 
institutions affected 
adversely 
Issuance of new 
securities reduced  
Market share and 
capital of bond 
insurers decreased 
Chart III.1: Flowchart of Bond Insurers’ downgrading 
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III.3. The Model 
This section includes 5 parts:  
1) Choose appropriate stochastic processes to capture the dynamics of bond values 
and the correlations between different bonds, which fluctuate through a business cycle. 
2) Use the mark-to-market criteria to identify the possible loss distribution for one 
bond over time. The potential losses include either loss at default or loss due to bond 
insurers’ downgrading.  
3) Identify the total loss distribution for a bond insurer. Both the liability side and the 
asset side are considered. 
4) Calculate economic capital, based on the total loss distribution. 
5) Develop smoothing rules in order to dampen the procyclicality of economic 
capital. 
6) Obtain the cumulative capital buffer. 
 
III.3.1 Stochastic Process 
Following Merton (1974)’s structural model, we assume that each bond corresponds 
to one project (or one firm). The funds available to the bond issuer for bond repayment 
by project i are represented by , which follow the stochastic process: iV
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tdWtatdWtatdttrtV tdV iimiii i 21−++= σ , Ni ,,1 ⋅⋅⋅= .        (III.1) 
In this equation,  refers to the risk-free interest rate; ( )tr ( )tiσ  is the instantaneous 
volatility of the cash flows by project i; ( )tWm  and ( )tWi  are two standard Wiener 
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process, where  refers to the systemic risk / market risk factor and  is an 
idiosyncratic component. And we assume that 
( )tWm ( )tWi
( ) ( )[ ] 0=tdWtdWE im , 
and ( ) ( )[ ] 0=tdWtdWE kj , { } kjNkj ≠∈∀ ,,...,1, . 
We use  to identify the business cycles. Specifically speaking, we connect 
 with bond yield spread
( )tWm
( )tWm 31. Generally, widened spreads implies that the market is 
factoring more risk of default, which is always related with certain degrees of credit 
crisis. Therefore, when bond yield spreads are high enough, e.g. ( ) WtWm ≥ , we assume 
that the economy is in crisis. Otherwise, the economy is in non-crisis. 
Additionally, the correlation factor ( )tai  is assumed to change over the cycle. That is, 
( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
<
≥=
WtWa
WtWa
ta
mi
mi
i ,
,
.                                                                                (III.2) 
And ii aa > , 01 <≤− ia , 11 ≤≤− ia . The assumptions mean that bonds tend to have 
higher correlation during financial crisis.  
Therefore, the total correlation between 
( )
( )tV
tdV
j
j  and ( )( )tV
tdV
k
k  is 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dttatatttV
tdV
tV
tdV
E kjkj
k
k
j
j σσ=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
. 
The stochastic instantaneous interest rate is assumed to follow the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross 
(CIR, 1985) process: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tdWtatdWtatrdttrbatdr rrmrr 21−++−= σ                              (III.3) 
                                                 
31 In section 4, we explain why we choose bond yield spread in detail. 
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where the strictly positive parameter a governs the speed of adjustment, b shows the long 
run value, rσ is the volatility of interest rate changes32, ( )tar  is the correlation factor with 
the systemic risk, and  is a standard Wiener process. ( )tWr
 
III.3.2 Loss Distribution 
For each bond, the losses faced by bond insurers can be decomposed into two parts: 
losses at bond’s default and losses due to bond insurers’ downgrading.  
 
III.3.2.1 Loss at Default 
Based on the model of Merton (1974, 1977), a bond defaults when the value of its 
cash flows  drops below the value of its payments at time t. ( )tVi
In this paper, we only analyze zero-coupon bonds, since coupon-paying bonds can be 
decomposed into the sum of several zero-coupon bonds. 
A zero-coupon bond i may default only when the bond matures. And it happens if the 
bond’s total asset value  falls below its face value. Assuming no violation of the 
absolute priority rule, with face value  and maturity , the value to debt-holders at the 
maturity is .  
iV
iF iT
( )[ ]iii FTV ,min
With bond insurance, the loss at default faced by bond insurer will be 
( ) ( )[ iiii TVFTLi −= ,0max1 ]
                                                
                                                                               (III.4) 
 
III.3.2.2 Loss due to Bond Insurers’ Downgrading 
 
32 An non-positive interest rate can be precluded if a and b have non-negative values and the condition 
 is met. 22 rab σ>
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Before the insured bonds default, based on mark-to-market rule, a bond insurer may 
still face some losses due to the market value changes caused by its downgrade. It has 
been observed during the latest crisis since 2007.  
Most of the insured bonds have the original rating of BBB to A before insurance. So, 
when a bond insurer faces a downgrade, such as from AAA to below BBB, the credit 
insurance becomes worthless and the prices of all the bonds insured by this insurer will 
fall to the prices of the risky bonds with no insurance and all the other same conditions. 
The bond insurer’s downgrade will cause market value declines of all its insured bonds. 
The timing of such losses is linked to the bond insurer’s downgrade, which is caused 
by a serious credit crisis in most cases. Therefore, the time point can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ){ }iimi FtVWtWt >≥= ,&:τ  
Here W  refers to the threshold of a credit crisis. If ( )tWm , represented by the bond yield 
spread, is no less than W , a credit crisis occurs and so does the downgrading of bond 
insurers. 
Obviously, for one specific bond, the time point of downgrading losses should be 
earlier than its maturity, i.e. ii T<τ , otherwise the bond insurer needs to pay out ( )iTLi1  at 
the time of default. 
The price of an uninsured zero-coupon bond at time t with risk-neutral probability Q 
is: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡ ∫=
−
i
Q
i
dssr
Q
t
N
i TVFeEtP i
iT
t ,min .      
On the contrary, the price at time t of an insured zero-coupon bond is 
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( ) ( )
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡ ∫=
−
i
dssr
Q
t
I
i FeEtP
iT
t . 
In this equation, we do not consider the default possibility of the bond insurer, since the 
purpose of this paper is to help bond insurers keep enough capital to avoid the 
downgrading and default risk. 
Therefore the loss for bond i at time iτ due to the bond insurer’s downgrade is the 
value of credit insurance: 
( ) ( ) ( )iNiiIiii PPL τττ −=2                                                                                          (III.5) 
In total, the loss for one insured bond is 
 ,                                                                           (III.6) ( ) ( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =
==
iii
iii
i tifL
TtifTL
tL ττ ,
,
2
1
depending on the different occurring time. According to our assumptions, the two parts of 
loss  and  can not occur at the same time. We only count one part of them at 
some time point when calculating the loss for one insured bond. 
( )ii TL1 ( )iiL τ2
 
III.3.3 Total Losses for a Bond Insurer 
As we mentioned in the previous part, bond insurers not only provide insurance for 
public and structured finance, but also invest in public and structured finance insured by 
other bond insurers. So we need to consider both sides of the financial statement: liability 
and investment. 
On the liability side, we assume a bond insurer provide insurance for  insurance 
contracts. The losses should be 
1n
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 .                                                                                                    (III.7) ( ) ( )∑
=
= 1
1
n
i
i tLtL
On the asset side, if certain investment portfolio is insured by some other bond 
insurer, the bond insurer will only face the losses due to bond insurers’ downgrading, 
assuming no default risk of bond insurers. Suppose a bond insurer invests in  insured 
bonds. Then the losses should be  
2n
( ) ( )∑
=
= 2
1
n
j
A
j
A tLtL ,                                                                                         (III.8) 
where  and , assuming no default risk for the other bond insurers. ( ) ( )tLtL jAj = iTt ≠
Here we assume the bond insurers are perfectly correlated. That is to say, when one 
bond insurer is downgraded, the rest bond insurers will be downgraded too. This 
assumption is consistent with most bond insurers downgrading since 2007.  
Combining both sides, the total losses for a bond insurer are 
( ) ( ) ( )tLtLtL AT += .                                                                                      (III.9) 
 
III.3.4 Economic Capital 
According to SOA’s Special Guide on Economic capital (2004), Economic Capital33 
can be defined as sufficient surplus to cover potential future losses, at a given risk 
tolerance level. Therefore, economic capital is calculated based on different risks 
assumed and is a forward-looking measure of capital adequacy. Corresponding to the 
                                                 
33 Since regulatory capital or rating agency capital is closely related with economic capital and can be 
somehow converted to an Economic Capital equivalent, we only investigate economic capital in this paper. 
Regulatory capital is minimum capital required by the corresponding regulatory agencies. Rating agency 
capital is the capital calculated by rating agencies, such as Moody’s, Standard &Poor’s and A.M. Best, to 
determine the company financial strength ratings. 
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assumed risks, we use market value (instead of book value) of assets and liabilities to 
estimate economic capital.  
In practice, economic capital is estimated against unexpected future losses at a 
selected confidence level (Chart III.2).  
Chart III.2: Economic Capital 
Expected Loss Confidence Level
Economic Capital 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f L
os
s 
Amount of Losses (increasing to the right)
 
 
Generally, economic capital can cover all kinds of risks a company is facing. In this 
paper, we mainly consider the default and market risks contained in the insurance 
products and investment portfolios mentioned in the previous section. That is, the risks 
here refer to .  refers to the corresponding cumulative probability distribution 
function. 
( )tLT ( )xF TL
And we utilize the most commonly used methods, Value at Risk (VaR), to calculate 
economic capital. Suppose α  is the given percentile of the loss distribution. Then the 
VaR at the end of each period (i.e. quarter) for the total loss at that period is 
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( )TLVaRα ( ){ }α≥∈= xFRx TL:min ( )α1−= TLF                                              (III.10) 
The economic capital, EC , at the beginning of each period is the VaR minus the 
expect value of the total loss for the same period, discounted backward one period at the 
risk free rate. Here we assume the capital is invested in risk-free assets for the single 
period. 
 
III.3.5 Capital Smoothing 
Short-term-oriented economic capital basically provides protection against potential 
losses for that certain period. Under this situation, economic capital may show pro-
cyclical trend over business cycles: 
1) During booms, the potential losses could be underestimated. So is the 
economic capital; 
2) In the crisis, the potential losses should be much higher. Correspondingly, the 
company has to prepare a large amount of economic capital, which worsens its 
financial situations further. 
The potential procyclicality of the New Basel Capital Accord in the bank industry has 
been extensively discussed. The possible solutions include:  
1) Kashyap and Stein (2004) point out that the target solvency probability in the 
regulatory rule should be time-varying over the cycle, because the shadow cost of bank 
capital varies. This argument can also be used in the internal system. 
2) Gordy and Howells (2006) explore several smoothing rules for capital. For 
example: 
a) Autoregressive Filter 
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( )1,,1,, ˆˆ −− −+= titititi CCCC α)  
where  is the unsmoothed output from the capital formula for bank i at time t; tiC ,
tiC ,
)
 denotes the smoothed capital requirement; and α is an adjustment parameter 
controlling the degree of smoothing. 
b) Counter-cyclical Indexing 
titti CC ,,ˆ α=  
where the smoothing parameter tα  changes correspondingly in each period, with 
the mean equal to one. And tα  should be greater than one in good economy and less 
than one in crisis. 
Additionally, Balla and McKenna (2009) shows the Spanish model of dynamic 
provisioning as a countercyclical tool for loan loss reserves. 
it
i i it
it
iitit AA
provisionSpecialAprovisionGeneral ∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+∆=
6
1
6
1
βα  
In this model, there exist six risk categories with different α or β assigned.  denotes the 
credit volume of asset i at time t.  
itA
All the above literature states the smoothing methods using the historical or current 
data. In this paper, we apply a forward-looking procedure to economic capital 
calculations in order to dampen procyclicality. 
tttt UECCE ω+=ˆ                                                                                              (III.11) 
where  denotes the economic capital at time t calculated by VaR in this paper. tEC tCE
)
 
refers to the smoothed economic capital at time t.  
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Most importantly, is determined over one full business cycle. For example, it can 
be 
tU
ttt ECECU −=                                                                                 (option 1) 
    
( )
t
T
ti
i
dss
ECECe
tT
i
t −∫+−= ∑=
− µ
1
1 .                                                        (III.12) 
tEC  refers to the average of predicted economic capital over the full business cycle, 
discounted to time t at the cost of capital.  
0≥tω  is the adjustment parameter. If 0=tω , there is no adjustment and . 
Otherwise 
tt ECCE =ˆ
0>tω . In this case, 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<>
><
ECECifECCE
ECECifECCE
ttt
ttt
,
,
)
)
 
Some alternative definition can be used for . tU
( ) ttttt ECECECU −⋅+= ∆+,ση                                              (option 2)             (III.13) 
where 0>η  is an adjustment parameter; ( )∆+ttEC ,σ  is the standard deviation of 
predicted discounted economic capital over the full business cycle. That is 
  
( )
2
2
2, t
dss
td ECeEC
t
t∫= − µ
(Option 2) is more conservative than (Option 1) of . Only when  tU
( dt ECECEC ση ⋅+> ) , instead of ECECt > , will tCE )  be adjusted downward, 
compared to . With all the other conditions same, (Option 2) is just a parallel shift of 
(Option 1). 
tEC
The third alternative for can be related with the total amount guaranteed. tU
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ttttt ECPECU −∆+= τ                                                      (option 3)             (III.14) 
where 0>tτ  is the adjustment parameter. 1−−=∆ ttt PPP  refers to the change of total 
contract amount guaranteed by the bond insurer from time t-1 to time t. Besides the 
insurance contract,  should also include the investment insured by the same or other 
bond insurers. So, 
tP
0>∆ tP  means the business of the bond insurer is in expansion, and 
 can be larger. On the contrary, tU 0<∆ tP  means that its business is in bad time, maybe 
in crisis, and then   can be smaller. tU
The features of smoothing methods mentioned here are: 
1) The smoothing is forward-looking. It utilizes the future estimated economic 
capital to adjust today’s value. 
2) The adjustment is based on a full business cycle, rather than one or two 
periods, to avoid underestimating the potential losses. 
3) When the adjustment parameter tω  is greater than one, the adjusted capital can 
be counter-cyclical. 
 
III.3.6 Establishing Capital Buffer 
With the smoothed capital, a bond insurer can actually establish some capital buffer 
in good times to support the potential losses in crisis. 
Suppose the capital buffer established since time 1. Then the cumulative capital 
buffer at time t would be: 
( ) ∑∑
==
=−=
t
j
jj
t
j
jjt UECCECB
11
ˆ ω  
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=
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jjj ECEC
1
ω )                                           (option 1) 
or ( )[ ]∑
=
∆+ −⋅+=
t
j
jjjjj ECECEC
1
,σηω                      (option 2) 
or [ jjjjt
j
j ECPEC −∆+=∑
=
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1
]
                                                
                                  (option 3)          
 
III.4. Modeling the Business Cycle 
The United States National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) identifies the 
dates of the peaks and troughs of the business cycle in the USA34. Then an expansion is 
the period from a trough to a peak, and a recession is the period from a peak to a trough. 
Table III.5 shows the data released on the NBER website. 
 
 
34 The determinants of the business cycle phases include real GDP, real income, employment, industrial 
production, and wholesale-retail sales. 
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Table III.5: US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions by NBER
BUSINESS CYCLE REFERENCE DATES DURATION IN MONTHS 
Peak Trough Contraction Expansion Cycle 
Quarterly dates Peak Previous trough Trough from Peak from 
are in parentheses to to Previous Previous 
  Trough this peak Trough Peak 
 December 1854 (IV) -- -- -- -- 
June 1857(II) December 1858 (IV) 18 30 48 -- 
October 1860(III) June 1861 (III) 8 22 30 40 
April 1865(I) December 1867 (I) 32 46 78 54 
June 1869(II) December 1870 (IV) 18 18 36 50 
October 1873(III) March 1879 (I) 65 34 99 52 
      
March 1882(I) May 1885 (II) 38 36 74 101 
March 1887(II) April 1888 (I) 13 22 35 60 
July 1890(III) May 1891 (II) 10 27 37 40 
January 1893(I) June 1894 (II) 17 20 37 30 
December 1895(IV) June 1897 (II) 18 18 36 35 
      
June 1899(III) December 1900 (IV) 18 24 42 42 
September 1902(IV) August 1904 (III) 23 21 44 39 
May 1907(II) June 1908 (II) 13 33 46 56 
January 1910(I) January 1912 (IV) 24 19 43 32 
January 1913(I) December 1914 (IV) 23 12 35 36 
      
August 1918(III) March 1919 (I) 7 44 51 67 
January 1920(I) July 1921 (III) 18 10 28 17 
May 1923(II) July 1924 (III) 14 22 36 40 
October 1926(III) November 1927 (IV) 13 27 40 41 
August 1929(III) March 1933 (I) 43 21 64 34 
      
May 1937(II) June 1938 (II) 13 50 63 93 
February 1945(I) October 1945 (IV) 8 80 88 93 
November 1948(IV) October 1949 (IV) 11 37 48 45 
July 1953(II) May 1954 (II) 10 45 55 56 
August 1957(III) April 1958 (II) 8 39 47 49 
      
April 1960(II) February 1961 (I) 10 24 34 32 
December 1969(IV) November 1970 (IV) 11 106 117 116 
November 1973(IV) March 1975 (I) 16 36 52 47 
January 1980(I) July 1980 (III) 6 58 64 74 
July 1981(III) November 1982 (IV) 16 12 28 18 
      
July 1990(III) March 1991(I) 8 92 100 108 
March 2001(I) November 2001 (IV) 8 120 128 128 
December 2007 (IV)     73   81 
Average, all cycles:     
1854-2001 (32 cycles) 17 38 55 56 
1854-1919 (16 cycles) 22 27 48   49 
1919-1945 (6 cycles) 18 35 53 53 
1945-2001 (10 cycles) 10 57 67 67 
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In our model, the economy is either in crisis state or in non-crisis state, instead of 
expansion or recession in the NBER business cycle. The identification is due to the 
features of bond insurers.  
1) Bond insurers’ operations heavily depend on credit market. Although credit 
market is closely related with the macro-economic variables, there may exist 
several-period lags. Additionally, not all the recessions will cause serious 
problems in credit market. 
2) Only crisis or deep recession may trigger the downgrading of bond insurers. A 
mild and short economic downturn only moderately increases the losses 
suffered by bond insurers, while severe downturns may cause catastrophic 
losses, which could downgrade bond insurers. 
So we choose a bond yield spread index as the variable representing the cycles. 
Specifically, we use the balance of Moody’s BAA corporate bond yield and Treasury 
bond rate to identify the cycles. We also checked Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield 
index and municipal bond indices. The identifications of cycles are basically the same. 
Since Moody’s corporate bond yield index provides more available data and most insured 
bonds have the rating around BAA, we choose Moody’s BAA corporate bond yield index 
(Chart III.3). 
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Chart III.3: Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Yield Spread 
 
This chart shows monthly data of Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Yield Spread from April 
1953 till January 2010. 
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The corporate bond yield index itself contains long-run trend and some short-term 
noises. So we adopt the approximate band-pass filters proposed by Baxer and King 
(1999) to measure business cycles. Their procedures isolate business cycle components 
by applying particular moving averages and eliminate the low frequency fluctuations 
associated with trend growth and the high frequency fluctuations associated with short-
term noises.  
Chart III.4 displays the cycle component of the Bandpass-Filtered Moody’s BAA 
Corporate Bond Yield Spread. Generally, higher bond yield spread refers to tighter credit 
market and even credit crisis.  
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 Chart III.4: Bandpass-Filtered Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Yield Spread- Cycle Component 
This Chart displays the cycle component of the Bandpass-Filtered Moody’s BAA Corporate 
Bond Yield Spread. Generally, higher bond yield spread refers to tighter credit market and even 
credit crisis. 
Bandpass-Filtered Moody's BAA Corporate Bond Yield Spread--Cycle Component
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
19
54
-0
4
19
55
-1
0
19
57
-0
4
19
58
-1
0
19
60
-0
4
19
61
-1
0
19
63
-0
4
19
64
-1
0
19
66
-0
4
19
67
-1
0
19
69
-0
4
19
70
-1
0
19
72
-0
4
19
73
-1
0
19
75
-0
4
19
76
-1
0
19
78
-0
4
19
79
-1
0
19
81
-0
4
19
82
-1
0
19
84
-0
4
19
85
-1
0
19
87
-0
4
19
88
-1
0
19
90
-0
4
19
91
-1
0
19
93
-0
4
19
94
-1
0
19
96
-0
4
19
97
-1
0
19
99
-0
4
20
00
-1
0
20
02
-0
4
20
03
-1
0
20
05
-0
4
20
06
-1
0
20
08
-0
4
 
 
According to Chart III.4, we choose that the cycle component of yield spread should 
be greater than 0.4355 when the economy is in crisis. 0.4355 is about the highest cycle 
component part value of yield spread from 2003 to 2004. Obviously, there is no recession 
during that period, based on the NBER cycle identification. The reason why we got a 
relatively high value may be the low Treasury bond rates during that period.  
This criterion captures the major economic troughs since 1954, compared with the 
NBER cycle. The differences are that 1) the length of crises in our identification is 
shorter than the contraction periods, and 2) there may be some lags between the troughs 
of the two identification methods. 
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To be consistent with the definitions in the model part, we normalize the criterion by 
adjusting the mean and standard deviation. That is 
 4738.1
2934.0
003065.04355.0 =−=W  
This is the unconditional threshold for the systemic risk factor. 
According to the unconditional threshold, 46 out of 660 months between April 1954 
and March 2009 were classified as “crisis” and the remaining 614 as “non-crisis”. 
Therefore, if we simply select a month at random, there is a 7% probability that it is 
classified as a crisis and a 93% probability of falling in a non-crisis status. These are the 
unconditional probabilities. Let 2=tS  if a month t is regarded as a crisis, otherwise 
. Then 1=tS
                    
⎩⎨
⎧
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==
%7)2Pr(
%93)1Pr(
t
t
S
S
Additionally, of 46 months characterized as crisis, 39 or 85% were followed by another 
month of crisis. Of 614 non-crisis months, 607 or 99% were followed by another non-
crisis month. Therefore the conditional probabilities are 
                   
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
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===
===
===
+
+
+
+
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%15)21Pr(
%1)12Pr(
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1
1
1
1
tt
tt
tt
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The Markov transition matrix is . ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
%85%15
%1%99
Based on the conditional probabilities, the conditional thresholds for W  should be 
adjusted correspondingly.  
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If , then at time t+1, the conditional threshold 1=tS 3263.21 ==WW  , 
where  refers to the cumulative standard normal distribution. That is to say, given 
,  if 
( )99.01−Φ=
Φ
1=tS 11 =+tS 3263.21 =<WW  and 21 =+tS  if 3263.21 =≥WW . 
Accordingly, if , then at time t+1, the conditional threshold 2=tS
0364.12 −==WW  . So, given ( 15.01−Φ= ) 2=tS , 11 =+tS  if 0364.12 −=<WW  and 
 if 21 =+tS 0364.12 −=≥WW . 
Between April 1954 and March 2009, the average length in non-crisis status is 88 
months and the one in crisis is 6.5-8 months. So the average length of one cycle is around 
8 years. In the next simulations, we assume 8 years as the length of a full business cycle. 
 
 
III.5 Simulation Results 
Monte Carlo simulations are used to estimate the previous model. 
 
III.5.1 Parameter Values 
In our example, we assume that this bond insurer provide insurance for 5 bond 
contracts and invest in one bond portfolio insured by some other bond insurers. The 
parameter values for all the project cash flows processes are listed in Table III.6. All the 
bonds are assumed to be zero-coupon bonds with different maturities.  
We assume that the bond insurer does not manage its portfolio actively. If a bond 
matures or defaults, the bond insurer will provide credit insurance for a new bond with 
the same characteristics. Thus the asset and liability sizes will remain constant over time. 
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 Table III.6: Parameter values for bonds and corresponding project values process 
This table provides the parameter values for 5 insured bonds (and corresponding projects) and 
one investment insured by the same bond insurer. ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tdWtatdWtatdttrtV tdV iimiii i 21−++= σ  
i Initial value 
of project 
Face 
Value  
Correlation 
factor in 
crisis status  
Correlation 
factor in non-
crisis status  
Volatility  Maturity 
of bond  
 ( )0iV  iF  ia  ia  iσ  iT  
1 10000 6000 -0.8 -0.4 0.15 8 
2 10000 6000 -0.8 -0.4 0.3 8 
3 10000 7000 -0.8 -0.6 0.15 8 
4 10000 8000 -0.8 -0.5 0.15 4 
5 10000 8000 -0.8 -0.4 0.3 4 
A 10000 6000 -0.8 -0.4 0.15 8 
 
The parameter values of interest rate process (equation 3) are listed in Table III.7. The 
initial interest rate ( ) is assumed to be 5 percent; the long run value (b) is 5 percent; 
the speed of adjustment (a) is 0.2; the volatility of interest rate changes (
( )0r
rσ ) is 0.05; the 
correlation factor ( ) is -0.5, since the systemic risk factor is represented by yield 
spread. 
ra
 
Table III.7: Parameter values for interest rate process 
This table shows the parameter value of interest rate process following the equation 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tdWtatdWtatrdttrbatdr rrmrr 21−++−= σ  
Parameter ( )0r  a b rσ  ra  
Value 5% 0.2 5% 0.05 -0.5 
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III.5.2 Simulation Steps 
Using these parameters, we run simulations to get the insurer’s total loss distribution. 
We generate 200 economic scenarios and 100 simulations of final project values in each 
scenario, with the total of 20000 paths. The detailed simulation steps are as follows: 
1) Use the unconditional probability [ ]%7%93 35 to simulate whether the economy 
is in crisis or non-crisis at the beginning of the period (t=0). 
2) Simulate 200 paths of economic scenarios for 8 years, based on the conditional 
probabilities. Along each path, we got the periods in crisis. 
3) Simulate systemic risk factor. If the economy in the previous period is in non-
crisis and in the current period is in non-crisis, the systemic risk factor for the 
current period is chosen below 2.3263. If the economy in the previous period is in 
non-crisis and in the current period is in crisis, the systemic risk factor is chosen 
above 2.3263. Similarly, if the economy in the previous period is in crisis and in 
the current period is in non-crisis, the systemic risk factor is chosen below             
-1.0364. If the economy in the previous period is in crisis and in the current 
period is in crisis, the systemic risk factor is chosen above -1.0364. 
4) Simulate interest rate for each economic scenario. 
5) Generate 100 project values for each contract under each economic scenario. 
6) Calculate the loss at default for each contract (at the maturity). 
7) Calculate the losses in crisis36, based on the economic status. From step 6) and 7), 
we obtain the total loss distributions for each period along a whole business cycle 
horizon. 
                                                 
35 The unconditional probabilities are consistent with the unconditional threshold for the systemic risk 
factor. 
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8) Estimate the value of economic capital at the beginning point of one period for 
each period, using the methodology described in section III.3.4. 
 
III.5.3 Calculating Unsmoothed and Smoothed Economic Capital 
We choose the parameter α for VaR as 99% to calculate the unsmoothed economic 
capital. The economic capitals over a business cycle, discounted to the value at time 0, 
are shown in Chart III.5 and III.6. We can observe a higher degree of capital fluctuation. 
Following Equation (III.11) and (III.12), we can obtain the smoothed economic 
capitals by assuming tω . Chart III.5 displays the smoothed economic capitals when 
2.1,7.0,4.0=tω . Obviously, when 1<tω , higher tω  could make the adjusted 
economic capital smoother over time. When 1=tω , the smoothed economic capital will 
just equal to the averaged economic capital. If 1>tω , the adjusted economic capital will 
be totally counter-cyclical. 
Following the rules shown in Equation (III.11) and (III.13), we need assume both tω  
and η to obtain the smoothed economic capitals. Chart III.6 displays the smoothed 
economic capitals when 7.0=tω  and 3.0,1.0,0=η . With η changing, the adjusted 
economic capital move parallel. 
As for the smoothing rule in Equation (III.11) and (III.14), tP∆  is not based on 
simulations and should be the change of real guaranteed amounts. We will not show the 
results here. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 We assume the bond insurers are downgraded in crisis. 
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Chart III.5: Unsmoothed vs Smoothed (Option 1) Economic Capital  
This chart shows the unsmoothed economic capital and smoothed economic capital using 
option 1 (equation III.11 and III.12). The smoothed economic capitals when 
2.1,7.0,4.0=tω  are displayed. When 1<tω , higher tω  could make the adjusted 
economic capital smoother over time. If 1>tω , the adjusted economic capital will be totally 
counter-cyclical. 
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Chart III.6: Unsmoothed vs Smoothed (Option 2) Economic Capital  
This chart shows the unsmoothed economic capital and smoothed economic capital using 
option 2 (equation III.11 and III.13). The smoothed economic capitals when 7.0=tω  and 
3.0,1.0,0=η  are displayed. With η changing, the adjusted economic capital move parallel. 
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III.5.4 Capital Buffer 
Based on the differences between smoothed and unsmoothed economic capital, we 
may establish some appropriate capital buffer, so that the extra capital in good time could 
be accumulated to pay the potential losses in crisis. 
Chart III.7 displays the cumulative capital buffer based on this simulated business 
cycle with 7.0=tω  and 3.0,0=η . When 0>η , more capital buffers can be accumulated.  
 
Chart III.7: Cumulative Capital Buffer 
This chart displays the cumulative capital buffer based on this simulated business cycle with 
7.0=tω  and 3.0,0=η . When 0>η , more capital buffers can be accumulated. 
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Of course, in practice, the business cycle will be simulated at each time point. 
Therefore, the unsmoothed and smoothed economic capital and the cumulative capital 
buffer will be adjusted correspondingly. 
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III.6. Contingent Capital Buffer 
Establishing a higher capital buffer during normal times may be costly. In order to 
reduce the cost of extra capital, some form of contingent capital can be applied. 
For example, Flannery (2009) advocate “contingent capital certificates”, designed for 
individual financial institutions. The certificates are supposed to convert from debt to 
equity automatically when the issuer’s equity ratio falls below certain level. 
Kashyap et al (2008) recommend “disaster insurance” for banks. Banks may acquire 
an insurance policy, which pays off certain pre-specified amount of money to the banks 
upon the occurrence of a systemic “event”. The trigger event is defined based on the 
aggregate performance of major financial institutions, instead of an individual institution. 
From the perspective of insurance provider, the insurance policy “would resemble an 
investment in a defaultable ‘catastrophe’ bond”. 
Bond insurance industry may also design similar mechanisms either for individual 
bond insurer or for the whole industry. And a bond insurer could determine the amount of 
their contingent capital buffer, based on the calculated cumulative capital buffer in the 
previous section. 
 
III.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we describe the business features of bond insurers and the impacts of 
business cycles on them. Then we adopt a structural model with time-varying 
correlations, which are closely tied up with the business cycle. By including both losses 
due to bond insurers’ downgrading and losses from insurance contracts and investment 
portfolio, we obtain the total loss distribution and corresponding economic capital of a 
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bond insurer. On that basis, we propose forward-looking smoothing rules of capital over 
a full business cycle, instead of only based on a short-term horizon, to avoid the 
procyclicality. The simulation results show the smoothed capital may vary from lower 
degree of procyclicality to totally counter-cyclicality, corresponding to the different 
parameter values. 
Based on the smoothed economic capital, the next important step is to establish some 
appropriate capital buffer, so that the extra capital in good time could be accumulated to 
pay the potential losses in crisis. In order to reduce the cost of extra capital, some form of 
contingent capital can be applied.  
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